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The Soviet Union has broken away from their traditional
autarkic views and entered the arena of world trade. Ini-
tially focusing on and enjoying the political and economic
benefits of trade with the West, the Soviets are now grad-
ually enlarging their trade activity and shifting their
attention to Third World markets for political and economic
gain. It is in the intent of the Soviet leadership to form
a more operable and las ng extension of power through a
stable triangle of influence, with Marxist/Leninist ideology
and political structure on one side, military support and
arms supply on • ..e other side, on an ever-expanding, sta-
bilizing economic base. This study examines the economic
motivati and viability of these Soviet inten-^ ons
.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. ECONOMIC VS. MILITARY CONFRONTATION
As the weapons of war have become more and more destruc-
tive in nature, to the point that their use is almost
unimaginable, direct military confrontation of the superpowers
has become less likely. With this superpower stand-off,
conflict and competition between the United States and the
Soviet Union will turn increasingly toward economic, vice
direct military, confrontation. This trend will accelerate
as the supplies of unrecoverable natural resources are
inevitably depleted and the Eastern bloc penetrates more
deeply into world trade.
In 1957, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev declared war
on the United States, not a military confrontation but rather
an economic confrontation. He said, "We declare war upon
you... in the peaceful field of trade. We declare a war. We
will win over the United States. The threat of the United
States is not the ICBM, but in the field of peaceful produc-
tion'.' [Ref. 1: p. 89] If the further and main competitive
arena of the superpowers is to be based on economic strength,
our trade policy application with the Eastern bloc must
include an economic evaluation as well as a military evalua-
tion of the effects of such trade. Of equal importance is
the full understanding of the intentions and effects of Soviet
world trade.
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It is only within the last thirty years that the Soviet
Union has developed the capabilities to extend the slightest
credible economic influence through trade and aid. Within
the last 15 years, there has been an accelerated decline in
the perceived Soviet military threat to Western Europe encour-
aging the continuation of regional detente, which equates to
increased East-West European trade. It is arguable whether
there has ever been a real Soviet military threat to the
Third World. Economic development rather than Soviet military
encroachment is of much greater immediate concern to most
world leaders.
Less than 15 years ago, in the early 1970 's, the Soviet
Union fully recognized the economic and political benefits
of world trade and broke from their traditional autarkic
views [Ref. 2: p. 18] . Entering the arena of world trade
in search of much needed technology and grain, the Soviets
initially focused on and enjoyed the benefits of trade with
the West. Moscow is now gradually enlarging trade activities
and shifting their attention to Third World markets to obtain
both economic and political gain.
B. SOVIET TRADE MOTIVATIONS
The Soviet Union's entry into world trade is primarily
driven by three complementary factors. First, and most im-
portantly, is the Soviet Union's inherent need to continuously
expand its influence and power, which is dictated by tradi-
tional Czarist Russian expansionism, and supported today
10
by Communist ideology and doctrine. The expansion of power
and influence is realized via three basic channels. These
three basic expressions of state power and influence are
exercised through state diplomacy, through the military and
through economics. While in the past the strength and impor-
tance of economic involvement has been beyond the grasp of
the Kremlin's leadership, it now plays an ever increasing
role in their strategy of world dominance.
The second complementary factor driving the Soviets toward
world trade lies in the pure economic benefit of trade. The
Kremlin leadership has, for over 15 years, witnessed the
economic and political benefit of trade. This has been evi-
denced by the growth and development of East-West European
trade with the resultant regional continuation of detente.
The Soviet Union's more recent attempts to expand trade with
the Third World can be closely coupled with the increasing
costs involved in the extraction of domestic natural resources
,
and the need to open markets for Soviet semifinished and
finished products.
Finally, the Soviet Union's entrance into Western and
Third World markets could eventually place additional compe-
titive strains on the United States and the entire free
market system. With rising protectionist sentiment through-
out many sectors of the free market system, continuing
emergence of the Eastern bloc command economies into non-
traditional markets could spark trade wars debilitating the
free market system. The inevitable consequence of such action
11
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on Mutual Economic Assistance. This economic integration,
with its resultant dependency, has effected near-total economic
reliance of those governments on the Soviet Union. The inclu-
sion of Cuba and Vietnam in the CMEA demonstrates the Soviet's
global ability to extend this binding economic influence.
It is the intent of the Soviet Union to form a more
operable and lasting extension of power through a stable
triangle of influence, with Marxist/Leninist ideology and
political structure on one side, military arms supply on the
other side, and an ever-expanding, stabilizing economic base
[Ref. 4: p. 77], The purpose of this study is to examine
the economic viability of these Soviet intentions, by review-
ing the economic and trade development of the Soviet Union
(Chapter II) , trace the effect of detente on East-West trade
(Chapter III), track the Soviet Union's entry into Third
World markets (Chapter IV) , and evaluate the probable devel-




II. HISTORIC SOVIET TRADE DEVELOPMENT
A. WORLD WAR I AND THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION
World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution disrupted for a
time and altered the form and type of trade conducted by
Europeans, Russians, and Americans. The war did not drasti-
cally change the long-established European trading patterns.
H weve the Bolsh ik Resolution, ^ -Allied block -de, and
revolutionary ec Jiic pc ^icy in R la fundamentally stopped
trade with the West for almost five years. By 1921, the
Soviet economy was almost in total collapse. There had been
sharp declines in agricultural and industrial production, wide-
spread disorganization of transportation, and acute shortages
of food and fuel. This led to peasant uprisings and riots
by factory workers in 1920. A "temporary retreat" from commu-
nism was necessary for the purpose of economic reconstruction.
On March the 17th, a New Economic Policy (NEP) was announced.
With this liberalization, the Soviets accepted a foreign
concessions policy. The Soviets accepted, or more appropri-
ately were forced to accept, a policy of foreign concessions
because the production facilities had all but ceased to
produce. The extent of Russia's economic collapse is superbly
exampled by the collapse of the Caucasus oilfields in 1921.
Antony C. Sutton, in Western Technology and Soviet Economic
Development 1917-1930 , asserts that by 1920-21, because of
labor shortages and inefficiency, transportation problems,
14
lack of maintenance supplies and equipment, and a total break-
down of the electrical supply system, the Caucasus oilfields
*
essentially ceased production.
Only through Soviet concessions to the United States,
Japan, the United Kingdom, Norway, Italy, France, and Germany,
was it possible to reverse Soviet declining oil production.
Western equipment, technology, and manpower was used in all
phases of Soviet oil production and transportation, from
actual drilling to the supply and welding of pipelines. Soviet
crude oil production and oil exports nearly tripled from 1923
to 1928 [Ref. 5: pp. 16-44]. The production and export of
oil and oil products was not only critical in the development
of much-needed hard currency, but was also essential to the
industrialization of the Soviet Union.
The Soviet-Western development of the oil industry is
representative of the development of most major industries
in the Soviet Union in the 1920' s. The Soviet oil industry
in the 1920 's was critical to the development of other heavy
industrial sectors and accounted for the major portion of
Soviet exports then, as it continues to do today. Addition-
ally, it provides background to the recent controversy over
the Siberian gas pipeline to Western Europe.
*
A detailed and more complete picture of the Caucasus oil-
field collapse is contained in Appendix A, extracted from
Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1917-1930,
by Antony C. Sutton. [Ref. 5: pp. 16-17]
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views on the e"fect of trade with the Bolsheviks were as
diverse in the early 1920 's as they are today.
I alieve we can save her (Russia) by trade. Com-
merce has a sobering influence. Trade, in my opinion,
will bring an end to the ferocity ... and the crudity of
Bolshevism surer than any other method.
Lloyd George, 1922
The capitalist countries .. .will supply us with the
materials and technology we lack and will restore our
military industry, which we need for our future victor-
ious attacks on our suppliers. In other word-/ they
will work hard in order to prepare their own licide.
V. I. Lenin, 1921
Many scholars today add t enin's aw that the capitalist
co^mtries will also supply the credit necessary to purchase
the needed materials and technologies for their ultimate
demise.
B. STALIN AND THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN
With the death of Lenin and the victory of Stalin over
Trotsky, a New Socialist's Offense, the first Five-Year Plan,
was initiated to rapidly industrialize the Soviet Union.
Stalin, in 1928, declared: "We are 50 .r 100 years behind
the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in
10 years. Either we do it, or we shall be crushed." [Ref.
6: p. 21] Stalin recognized the immediate need to continue
trade with the West to achieve rapid industrial growth. At
the same time, he demanded Soviet self-reliance. To accom-
modate these demands, the granting of concessions was halted
in favor c the direct purchas of Western idustrial goods
and proces:=.-3. This policy ra dly exhausted the Soviet
hard currency and credits. By 19 31, the Soviet Union's
16
trade deficit was 230 million rubles. To alleviate the
deficit, the Soviet Government curtailed foreign imports
and broke many existing contracts with Western firms. [Ref.
7: p. 2]
Through the 1930 's, the Soviets' principle trading partner
continued to be Germany, based on the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo.
The German-Soviet agreement established strong economic and
political ties between the two outcast powers. The Rapallo
Treaty was supported by a commercial treaty on 12 October
1925, and the Treaty of Berlin in 1926 [Ref. 8: p. 1034] .
A Nazi-Soviet trade agreement in August 19 39 continued the
legacy of German-Soviet trade. In expressing the Soviet
view of the agreement, Molotov said, "this agreement is
advantageous to us because of its credit conditions and
because it enables us to order a considerable additional
quantity of such equipment as we need" [Ref. 9: p. 2]
On 22 June 1941, Soviet-German trade stopped.
C. WORLD WAR II AND THE COLD WAR
World War II and the ensuing cold war transformed the
traditional European trading patterns. Tensions between the
Soviet Union and the other Allied powers began to surface
before the end of the war. Thus, with the defeat of Germany,
the United States and Great Britian almost immediately cut
off the supply of lend-lease material to the Soviet Union.
Figure 1 [Ref. 10: p. 63] depicts the drastic reduction of


















































low of $19,999 in 1953. The economic isolation of the Soviet
Union, and consequently Eastern Europe from Western Europe,
was firmly established by the Soviets' expected refusal to
cooperate in the Marshall Plan. The Coordinating Committee
(COCOM) was also established to standardize member countries'
prohibited items of export to the Communist bloc. The COCOM
was additionally charged with establishing a recommended
policy on export control.
In the early 1950' s, Stalin established the theory of
two world markets, the socialist world market and the capital-
ist world market, which included the Third World. Interaction
between these separate markets would not only be undesirable,
but unnecessary. Malenkov elaborated on Stalin's thesis at
the XIX Congress of the CPSU, stating:
As Comrade Stalin pointed out, the united compre-
hensive world market has disintegrated and formed two
parallel world markets: the market of countries on
the peaceful democratic camp, and the market of the
countries of the aggressive camp. The disintegration
of the united comprehensive world market is the most
important economic result of the Second World War and
its economical consequences.
Two world markets are developing in opposite di-
rections. The new, democratic peaceful world market
has no difficulties in selling goods because its
capacity is increasing year by year, and accordingly
there is a crisis-free growth of production in the
countries of the democratic camp because the non-
stop growth of production is extending more and more
the capacity of the democratic market. [Ref. 11:
p. 82]
D. KHRUSHCHEV, THE THEORY OF "PEACEFUL TRANSITION"
With Stalin's death in 1954, and the emergence of Khrush-
chev's leadership in 1956, economic relations between the
19
two blocks began to change. Unlike Stalin, Khrushcr saw
the potential benefits of both international trade and aid.
He formulated the theory of "peaceful transition" for the
economic evolution of newly independent countries toward
socialism. He believed that by giving aid, principally in
the form of large industrial complexes intended for state
ownership, the Soviet Union could obtain control of the
country's foreign trade and guide it intc socialism. He
formulated hat if 40 percent of a deve ^ping country's fo:
eign trade was with the Soviet Union, that country could be
forced down the Socialist path (Ref. 11: p. 7l) . A pre-
requisite of this peaceful transition was the elimination of
class interest. The newly independent countries of Africa
were appealing targets for Khrushchev's new policy. They
were seen as truly classless societies with small national
economies, thereby making it less difficult to capture a
large proportion of their foreign trade.
To further his Third V Id expansionist goal^ Khrushchev
attended the 15th United Nct_ions General Assembly meeting,
promising support in the "liquidation of the past colonial
system." To African national representatives, he further
promised that "we are prepared to provide aid whenever you
request it."(Ref. 11: p. 72) Unfortunately for Khrushchev
and the Third World, these proved to be hollow promises.
The grandiose promises and plans of 'hrushchev for
capturing the Thii : World through the process of peaceful
20
transition was beyond the economic power of the Soviet Union.
Soviet economic aid to the Third World from 1955 to 1964
totaled only $2,566 million. The aid was essentially
machinery, equipment, and turnkey projects which were plagued
by the poor quality of goods and construction delays. Table
I VRef 11: p. 72) illustrates the Third World regional dis-
tribution of Soviet economic and military aid during this
period.
TABLE I
Soviet Economic and Military Aid
to the Third World, 1955-1964
(million U.S. $)


















Source: Gu Guan-fu, "Soviet Aid to the Third World, An
Analysis of Its Strategy," Soviet Studies , Vol. XXXV, no. 1 d. 72
While military aid at this time was almost twice as large as
economic aid ($4,291 vs. $2,566 million) , it was in much
closer balance then than now. Recently, Soviet military aid
has been about six times the amount of its economic aid.
[Ref. 12: p. 9]
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E. KHRUSHCHEV AND EAST-WEST TRADE
In addition to a fundamental shift in the Soviet approach
toward the Third World, 1956 marks in time a drastic change
in the Soviet perception of East-West trade. In that year,
Khrushchev visited Britain with his famed 1,000 million pound
sterling shopping list; the list included over 300 machine
tools, and over 1,000 types of foundry equipment [Ref. 13:
p. 153] . John W. De Pauw reports in Soviet-American Trade
Negotiations that the first positive step toward an expansion
of U.S. -Soviet trade was taken in 1956 when President Eisen-
hower authorized the decontrol of some 700 items in 57 com-
modity categories for the export to the USSR and Eastern
Europe. Figure 1 reflects Khrushchev's trade initiative
showing an increase in U.S. exports to the Soviet Union from
^19,000 in 1953 to $3,819,000 in 1956. Additional initiatives
were taken in 1959 when Soviet Communist Party First Secretary
Khrushchev and President Eisenhower, during the course of the
Camp David talks, explored the subject of trade between their
respective countries. Specific mention was made at these
talks of those commodities with commercial potential as well
as those falling within the category of strategic items. The
net effect of this meeting was an increase in the export of
U.S. manufactured goods, including consumer durables, to the
Soviet Union. [Ref. 14: p. 1]
During the same timeframe. Western Europe was also start-
ing to reestablish historic trade ties with Eastern Europe.
Trade between Western and Central Europe had been a normal
22
and desirable activity. Traditional Russo-German trade examples
the long historic development of East-West trade. Angela Stent
Yergin in East-West Technology Transfer; European Perspectives
reports that for over a century, Germany had exported advanced
machinery to Russia in return for imports of raw materials.
The same paper provides the following statistics which reveal
the historic common orientation of the two economies:
From 1858 to 1362, imports from Germany were 28
percent of Russia's imports, and exports to Germany
were 16 percent of Russia's exports. From 1868 to
1872, the figures were 44 percent and 24 percent re-
spectively. In 1914— the best year—the figures were
47 percent and 29 percent. After the Bolshevik revo-
lution, the Soviet government continued to seek German
machinery imports, and there was considerable German-
Soviet clandestine military cooperation. Although the
volume of trade between the two countries declined
after the Nazis came to power, German-Soviet economic
cooperation continued until the Nazi invasion of the
USSR. [Ref. 15: p. 17]
These traditional trading patterns were altered by WWII and
the political considerations of Western Europe at the conclu-
sion of the war. At that time. Western Europe was reliant on
the economic power of the United States exercised through the
Marshall Plan.
On 25 March 1957, the Rome Treaties were concluded (Ref.
8: p. 1182). These treaties created the European Economic
Community (EEC) . The Federal Republic of Germany insisted
on a special protocol to reaffirm the economic unity of
Germany, which had been an initial stated goal of the Allies
at the end of WWII. As a result, it was established that
inter-German trade would not be affected by the European
Economic Community's regulations [Ref. 16: p. 31]. In
23
respects this protocol had an enormous impact on East-West
trade; it had provided an opening or a gap for trade between
the EEC and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA
or COMECON)
.
COMECON had been established in 1949 by Stalin as an alter-
native to the Marshall Plan. Its policies, not surprisingly,
like Stalin's were inward-looking, designed to promote Soviet
power and integrate the region economies. COMECON members
now include the Soviet Union, German Democratic Republic,
Romania, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia,
Cuba, and Vietnam. Yugoslavia has associate membership, and
Finland, Iraq, and Mexico have cooperation agreements with
COMECOM. In addition, Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Laos,
Mozambique, and Yemen (Aden) have been granted observer status
in the CMEA. Mirror imaging the intent of COMECOM, the
Soviet Union viewed the EEC as a political and economic arm
of NATO. In a thesis on the Common Market by the Moscow
Institute of World Economy and International Affairs in
1957, it was asserted that "no doubt the European Economic
Community will accelerate the process of self-destruction"
[Ref. 17: p. 3]. The Soviets wanted to keep East European
countries from trading with the EEC, to avoid capitalist
contamination and reduce the viability of the EEC. But
Poland, in 1965, and Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania in 1969,
had reached technical agreements with the European Economic
Community on the imposition of farm levies on their sales to
EEC countries. (Ref. 17: p. 3)
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F. THE DECLINING SOVIET THREAT
Between 1956 and 1969, with some serious deviations from
the norm, the perceived Soviet military threat to the West
gradually declined. This decline was coupled with a rebound
of the export-oriented European economies. Without a firm
consensus on the intentions of the Soviet Union, Western
Europe looked to traditional markets in Eastern Europe to
sustain their economic development. The theory that the
Soviet Union was evolving and maturing took shape. Essen-
tially, the argument was that:
The Soviets, to solve their economic internal
problems, would need and would seek Western help.
Such assistance should be offered so that Moscow
would then become entangled with Western exports,
credits, imports, etc. (Ref. 2: p. 8)
The theory was based on establishing interdependence between
the world systems, thereby making war within the system too
costly to consider seriously.
President Kennedy is credited by some for initiating the
era of detente. In his address to the American University
in 1963, he stressed the world's common interests and the
hope for constructive change within the Communist bloc:
So let us not be blind to our differences, but
let us also direct attention to our common interests
and to the means by which those differences can be
resolved. And if we cannot end our differences, at
least we can help make the world safe for diversity.
For in the final analysis, our most basic common link
is that we all inhabit this planet. We all breathe
the same air. We all cherish our children's future.
And we are all mortal.
Third: Let us reexamine our attitude toward the
cold war, remembering that we are not engaged in a
debate, seeking to pile up debating points....
25
We must, therefore, preserve in the search for
peace in the hope that constructive changes within
the Communist bloc might bring within reach solutions
which now seem beyond us. We must conduct our affairs
in such a way that it becomes in the Communists' in-
terest to agree on a genuine peace. (Ref. 2: p. 91
President Johnson attempted to carry the Kennedy theme
further through "building bridges" to Eastern Europe, "bridges
of increased trade, of ideas, of visitors, and of humanitarian
aid." He placed emphasis on the development of trade and
understanding between the United S* ^ites and the Soviet Union,
and recommended a two track NATO pu -icy of "detente and
defense." (Ref. 2: p. 20"\
Each successive United States President from Eisenhower
to Nixon brought the nation closer to detente with the Soviet
Union. The enduring keystone of detente was the opening of
East-West, and trade.
26
III. DETENTE- INCREASED EAST-WEST TRADE
A. THE SOVIET VIEW OF TRADE IN THE 1970 'S
During the 1960 's the Soviet Union, still leery of the
consequences of foreign trade, gradually increased trade with
the West and the Third World. By 1970, the Soviet fear of
capitalist contamination had been replaced by a driving
desire to increase their economic well-being, influence, and
world presence through trade and aid. This shift in foreign
trade policy resulted from the Soviet Union's recognition of
the economic and political benefits derived from trade. V. I,
Lenin, of course, supported this new view of Soviet foreign
trade. The USSR Report on the Foreign Economic Relations of
CMEA Countries Under the Conditions of Socialist Integration
points out that, "the concept of the foreign or world market
is inseparable from the concept of the international division
of labor, which constitutes the basis of the entire system of
world economic relations. The degree of development and the
scale of the world market is inseparably connected with the
degree of specialization of national labor'.' (Ref. 4: p. 77)
The same report bluntly points out the Soviet-perceived
connection between foreign trade and other form.s of cooper-
ation, stating that "one must not underestimate the impor-
tance of foreign trade and other forms of cooperation, since
the other forms of cooperation are directly or indirectly
connected with foreign trade'.' (Ref. 4: p. 77) More
27
important than the political op rtuni" s for the Soviet
Union, pre -^nte by increased world tr -a, was the immediate
need for ..estern and Third World products. From the West,
the Soviets needed advanced technology to improve and modern-
ize their industrial base. They also needed grain from both
the West and the Third World to make up for the lack of growth
in domestic production, and to meet the minimum goals set by
the 10th Five-Year Plan.
B. SHIFTING PATTERNS OF TRADE
Political and econc c needs served to reduce gradually
the strong opposition which thr oviet Union had voiced toward
dealings with the West. Leonid Brezhnev's comments on dealing
with the EEC illustrate this changed Soviet attitude. On 20
March 1972, Brezhnev stated that:
The Soviet Union by no means ignores the real
situation w'-ich has emerged in VJestern Europe, in-
cluding tht: existence of an economic grouping of
capitalist ,ountries known as the Coramon Market.
We are carefully observing the activ ty of the Com-
mon Market and its evolution. Our r ^ations with
the participants in the grouping will, needless to
say, depend on the extent to which they recognize
the realities in the socialist part of Europe, par-
ticularly the interests of the member countries of
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)
.
We are for equality in economic relations and against
discrimination. [Ref. 17: p. 3]
The Soviet Union wanted the European Community to recognize
and deal through COMECON for the Soviet's recognition of the
EEC. There was little apparent gain for the European Commu-
nity from such mutual recognition. In the early 1970' s, it
was felt that the East Europeans needed trade with the West
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more than the West needed trade with the East. This is
demonstrated in the East-West trade deficits. Between 1958
and 1970, COMECON's exports to the European Community rose
300 percent, while the Community's exports to C0^4EC0N rose
385 percent. For the year 1974, the CMEA (C0r4EC0N) imported
$12 billion worth of investment and consumption goods, while
the European Community purchases approximately $9 billion
worth of raw materials, energy products, and an increasing
number of partially-manufactured goods. [Ref. 18: p. 26]
These trade increases show that the early 1970 's ushered
in detente, and detente meant increased East-West trade. In
November of 1971, the Secretary of Commerce led a U.S. dele-
gation to the Soviet Union for the first official talks on
expansion of trade and other commercial relations. (See Ref. 14,
p. 3.) This, as Jurgen Notzold asserts, came in the wake of
the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) negotiations, the
Four-Power Agreement on Berlin, the so-called "Eastern"
treaties of the Federal Republic, and the fundamental treaty
between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic,
establishing a new legal basis for political relations with
both the U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany. The
attempts at an understanding between the superpowers and the
Eastern policy of the Federal Republic of Germany led to the
elimination of a significant part of the uncertainty concern-
ing political and security questions which had for long over-
laid East-West economic relations. [Ref. 19: p. 182]
29
The reopening O''" ^ast-West trade brought a d; :tinct
regional redistribu' on of Soviet capital goods imports away
from the CMEA to the OECD countries. The CMEA share of trade
with the Soviet Union declined from 71.5 percent in 1973, to
54.9 percent in 1976, while that of the OECD countries rose
during the same period from 25.9 percent to 40.3 percent.
This shift is presented in Table II.
TABLE II
Redistribution of Capital Goods
(Shares of OECD and CMEA countries in USSR imports
of machinery and transport equipment, in percent.)
1955 1960 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
OECD 16.5 25.5 25.9 25.9 30.3 38.5 40.3 38.0 31.7 30.2
.1.3 10.7 9.2 7.0 7.0
5.0 6.0 3.6 1.9 2.4
4.9 4.8 6.0 5.7 4.5
4.7 4.9 4.9 4.7 4.8
3.5 3.1 4.2 3.3 2.8
1.7 1.7 0.9 1.6 1.8
3.5 5.0 5.8 5.1 4.3
CMEA 79.2 72.1 70.8 71.5 65.7 57.2 54.9 57.3 63.0 64.8
Of which:
GDR 42.5 34.5 24.6 24.5 21.9 18.4 17.0 17.4 17.8 18.8
Czech 16.9 17.5 1600 13.3 12.5 10.9 - 11.2 12.9 12.4
Poland 8.0 7.2 11.1 11.4 10.6 9.9 8.8 9.3 10.4 11.8
OECD countries: USA, Japan, W. Germany, France, Italy
Great Britain, Sweden, Finland, Austria,
Switzerland
CMEA countries: German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czech-
slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria




W.Germany 1.8 5.8 3.3 7.3 9.2
USA 0.0 1.7 0.6 3.2 3.1
Japan 0.0 1.1 2.9 3.0 3.1
France 1.1 3.7 4.2 2.6 4.4
Italy 0.5 1.8 4.8 2.8 2.6
UK 2.9 3.4 2.6 1.7 0.9
Finland 7.3 4.8 3.5 2.6 2.9
C. DIVERGENT U.S. TRADE POLICY
Through the mid-1970 's, and into the 1980's, trade between
the West and East grew at an ever-accelerating pace. Accord-
ing to John Starrels, in 1982, combined U.S. -E.G. trade with
the Soviet Union and GOMEGON's partners came to $48 billion
[Ref. 20: p. 25]. U.S. and West European subsidies contri-
buted to the acceleration of this trade [Ref. 21: p. 1].
The deteriorization of the Soviet-U.S. relations in the wake
of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Polish crisis, and
Washington's reassessment of the policies of detente, have
served to reduce U.S. trade with GOMEGON's European members
to $3.6 billion in 1982. This is a decline from $8 billion
in 1979, and represents a $1 billion decline between 1981
and 1982. Western European trade policies with the East have
not been in harmony with the policies of the United States.
During the time that the United States was diminishing trade
with the East, the West Europeans have continued to foster
closer economic and trade relations with GOMEGON members.
The scale of East-West trade in 1982 is shown in Table III.
This divergent economic policy has created considerable
strain between the United States and the European Gommunity.
In concert with the interdependent policies of detente, the
European Economic Gommunity has continued to seek trade with
Eastern Europe as a means to induce moderate behavior on the
part of the USSR, and foment reform at the very heart of the
Soviet system [Ref. 22: p. 600]. From Washington's global




E.G. exports to Eastern Europe $ 16.9 billion
E.G. imports from Eastern Europe $ 2.4 billion
E.G. exports to USSR $ 8.8 billion
E.G. imports from USSR $ 16.7 billion
U.S. exports to Eastern Europe $ 1.01 billion
U.S. imports from Eastern Europe $839.4 billion
U.S. exports to USSR $ 7 billion
U.S. imports from USSR $22. million
Source: See Ref. 20, p. 26.
behavior in recent years, it is difficult to assert that
Soviet behavior has been moderate. But it can be said with
certainty that East-West trade has—at least in the short run
—
benefited Western Europe and the Eastern bloc.
For the technologically superior, export-oriented econ-
omies of Western Europe, the Eastern bloc appeared to be
perfect trading partners. To bolster sagging growth and
productivity, the Soviets needed Western technology; to com-
pensate for stagnant agricultural production, and to meet
planned increases in meat production, they needed grain. The
West, anxious to cultivate and expand foreign markets to
insure continued post-WWII growth, wanted traditional imports
of energy and raw materials from the Soviets. Ignoring polit-
ical considerations, this trade appears as a mat ^h made in
heaven.
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D. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL TRADE
The performance of the Soviet agricultural sector had,
until the early 1970 's, generally kept pace with rising demand.
From 1950 to 1970, Soviet agricultural output grew at an annual
rate of about 3.9 percent, which compares favorably to U.S.
agricultural production which grew at an annual rate of about
two percent during the same time period. This relatively
steady increase in Soviet agricultural production, and trend
estimates of further grain production, is depicted in Table IV.
Soviet agricultural policy rests on a system of subsidies
to insure stable food prices for consumers at 40 to 50 percent
of the cost of production. Food costs for Soviet consumers
has remained essentially constant since the mid-1950' s, while
wages have increased steadily, creating higher demand [Ref.
23: p. 16-17]. The combination of price subsidies, fostering
the wasteful use of resources, lower labor productivity, cen-
tral planning inefficiency, poor weather, and increased
consumer demand have resulted in reduced agricultural growth
and the steady increases of grain and feed imports. Figure 2
reflects the Soviet Union's net grain trade from 1955 to 1981.
From 1972 until 1979, the United States, Canada, and
Australia had relative equal shares in the export of grain to
the USSR. As the fourth major supplier of grain to the Soviets
during this period, Argentina consistently supplied a larger
amount of grain to the Soviet Union than the other major
suppliers. 1980 marked the beginning of President Carter's
grain embargo in response to Soviet moves in Afghanistan.
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TABLE IV




























Source: U.S. Cong., Joint Economic Committee, "Soviet Economy in the
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In the initial search for cooperation between the other major
suppliers of grain to the Soviets, Australia and Canada agreed
to limit their sales to "normal and traditional" quantities.
Argentina, where grain sales accounted for 30 percent of all
exports , had much more to lose in the embargo of grain to the
Soviets. The timing of President Carter's announcement of the
embargo also played a role in Argentina's decision not to
participate. Carter's decision to impose the grain embargo
came late on Friday, the 4th of January. Washington officials
were unable to contact Buenos Aires officials to solicit
cooperation prior to the President's telecast announcing the
embargo. Displeasure at the lack of prior consultation, coupled
with the friction created by Washington-voiced human rights
issues, and the relative importance of grain exports to the
economy, were compelling reasons in the Argentinian Government's
decision not to support the grain embargo.
As U.S. exports of grain to the Soviet Union were being
reduced, but not eliminated, Argentina's exports were filling
the void. Recognizing the realities of the ill-conceived
embargo, Canada and Australia followed Argentina's lead and
soon increased their sales of grain to the Soviet Union.
Subsequent long-term governmental agreements have reduced
the share of U.S. grain exports to the Soviet Union, and made
the selective embargo of grain more costly for the United




Old lessons on the effectiveness of embargos were re-
learned as the cooperation of other grain suppliers to the
Soviet Union unraveled. It can be effectively argued that,
in the long run, the United States, through reduced grain
sales was hurt more by the grain embargo of 1980 than the
Soviet Union. Short of war, it is unlikely that grain will
ever again be used as a "weapon of peace" against the Soviet
Union. iRef. 23: pp. 124-139)
E. THE DISMANTLING OF DETENTE
The dismantling of detente, including a shift in trade
policy, started with the Jackson-Stevenson amendments to the
trade act. U.S. trade credit was linked to Soviet Jewish
emigration policy. This effectively denied further United
States credit to the Soviet Union. William G. Hyland notes
that "for the first time, a sociological-political change
within the USSR became an official object of U.S. foreign
policy, a complete turnover of the containment/evolution
theory." ^Ref. 2: p. 320) United States trade policy toward
the Soviet Union continued to evolve during the Carter admin-
istration, particularly after the Afghanistan invasion, and
took on new dimensions with the election of President Reagan.
William P. Clark, as the President's National Security Advi-
sor, stated that in our new oolicy, "we must force our princi-
pal adversary, the Soviet Union, to bear the brunt of its
economic shortcomings." [Ref. 24: p. 272] Important aspects
of the President's policy have apparently been an attempt
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to further tax what is s 'n as the over-extended, fragile
economic system, by denyin j the Soviets the means of obtain-
ing additional hard currency, further stressing the Soviet
system by engagement in an arms race which the President
feels they "cannot win," and by increasing efforts to deny
the Soviet new technological capabilities from the West,
which is viewed as a key element for the continued economic
development.
The controversial effectiveness of the United States'
policy came to a head in Western Europe with the Reagan admin-
istration's embargo of 22 June 1982 on equipment sales by
European licensees and subsidiaries of U.S. companies for
the 3,600-mile Soviet gas pipeline to Western Europe. [Ref.
25: p. 2] On 12 August 1982, the European Community delivered
a note and a lengthy set of legal comments to the U.S. State
and Commerce Departments on the export administration regula-
tions issued by the United States on 22 June affecting the
Soviet pipeline. The text of the protest from the European
Community is provided in Appendix B. (See Ref. 25, p. 6) It
clearly questions the legal, political, and economic position
of the United States in its move to stop the shipment of high
technology equipment to the Soviet Union. The European Com-
munity note also presents many of the differing views on East-
West trade and technology transfer.
It is obvious from the European Community's reaction to
the Reagan administration's embargo that they do not share
Washington's views on the East-West trade and technology transfer,
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The West Europeans feel that the Reagan administration simply
does not understand, and is insensitive to, their situation.
Western Europe is just now fully recovered from the effects
of the 1973 OPEC oil price increases. The Soviets have proven
to be a reliable supplier of energy products; the importation
of oil and natural gas from the Soviet Union is not something
new.
In 19 81 the West German government imported 17 percent
of its natural gas from the Soviet Union. Norman Crossland
reports that "the Germans are comforting themselves with the
thought that the Russians--in their business arrangements
with West Germany--have always kept to the spirit and letter
of agreements. Some commentators have been reminding us,
not very tactfully, that even as the Germans launched their
attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, the Russians were con-
scientiously fulfilling their agreement to supply Nazi Germany
with grain. East-West trade and the pipeline construction
also meant jobs to the West Europeans; 25,000 in West Germany
on the pipeline alone, and 150,000 based on the export trade
to Eastern Europe. [Ref. 26: p. 6]
To develop further the background of the current Soviet
oil production, it is extremely interesting to note in Table
V the recent suppliers of oil and gas equipment for the
Soviet industry. Against this background, and the lifting
by the U.S. of the grain embargo imposed by President Carter
in 19 79, it is little wonder that West Europeans viewed
President Reagan's sanctions with such disdain.
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TABLE V




Supplier 1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Total 21 133 199 126 251 136
of which:
Romania 13 25 31 39 52 70
USA — 36 30 21 38 22
W. Germany — 35 53 15 10 1
France 2 17 16 12 1 15





et. al. , The Soviet Union
1980-81
. p. 171.
The European note also punctuates differing opinions on
the Soviet's internal technological capability and the effects
of technology obtained from the West. This difference of
opinion is not restricted to the Reagan administration and
the European Community; literature on Soviet technological
capabilities covers the entire spectrum of possibilities,
from th ^ Soviet view that:
The Party has restored a Leninist and profoundly
scientific approach to the "solution of economic pro-
blems." Just as Lenin put forward the task of estab-
lishing the material and technical foundation for
socialism through industrialization of the country,
so the Party has worked out, at this new stage, a plan
for the creation of the material and technical basis
of communism. One of the distinctive features of the
past decade has been the fact that the Party initiated
and led the scientific and cultural revolution and thus
placed the Soviet Union in the forefront of world
scientific and technical progress, making socialism
its standard bearer. [Ref. 27: p. 125]
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From this assessment of Soviet technological lead, which is
supported by some Western authors, the gamut runs to Anthony
C. Sutton's assessment that:
No fundamental industrial innovation of Soviet
origin has been identified in the Soviet Union between
1917-65 .... Soviet innovation has consisted, in substance,
in adapting those made outside the USSR or by using
those made by Western firms specifically for the
Soviet Union and for Soviet industrial conditions
and factor patterns. [Ref. 28: p. 15]
The actual technological capabilities of the Soviet Union
must lie somewhere between these opposing views.
F. SOVIET TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES
1. The Soviet Need for Technology
An understanding of the position and strength of the
Soviet Union's technological capabilities, and how those
capabilities affect Soviet policy, is of vital importance
to the development of Western policies on East-West trade
and technology transfer. This is particularly important in
view of the divergent paths which the United States and
Western Europe have taken concerning these issues, which
have been accentuated by the U.S. embargo on equipment sales
for the Soviet gas pipeline. Underlying the current contro-
versy is the assumption that the Soviet Union is in a very
vulnerable economic position, reliant on the introduction
of Western technology for continued economic growth. The
assertion has been made that:
The entire Eleventh Plan (1981-1985) , in fact,
rests on measures to promote what the Soviets call
"intensification," that is, more efficient use of
existing resources rather than mobilization of
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additional ones. The other key policy on which
success hinges is a large increase in labor pro-
ductivity, -o be achieved through better manage-
ment and more efficient technological innovation;
over five years the Soviet leaders hope to gain
23 percent in industry and agriculture, and 15
percent in construction. [Ref. 29: p. 223]
If it is not within the Soviet's capability to provide the
technology necessary to achieve these needs, they will by
necessity seek these technologies in the West.
The proclaimed scientific nat' "e of Marxist-Leninist
doctrine, an-^ the government's contin- jd emphasis on sc _ -nee
and technology, for not on__ the Soviet Union's economy, but
also for political purposes is demonstrated in Brezhnev's
1968 speech proclaiming:
It can be said without exaggeration that in this par-
ticular field, the field of scientific-technological
progress, now lies one of the main fronts of the his-
torical competition of the two systems. For our party
the further intensive development of science and tech-
nology and the wise introduction of the latest
scientific-technological achievements , is not only
the central economic task, but also an important
P'.^litical task. (See Ref. 3, p. 35)
This statement emphasizes the need and acceptance of techno-
logical innovation and change. Yet today, by many estimates,
the Soviet's technological capabilities are extremely uneven.
In some areas surpassing the most advanced Western country,
and in other areas 10 to 20 years behind, this difference
in itself creates serious difficulties for Soviet planners.
The 11th Five-Year Plan, adopted by -he 26th Congress
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, "emonstrates
their reliance on the introduction of new te ^-ology. The
basic goals cited in the current Five-Year Plan include:
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—Elaborating a system of measures for the continuous
rise in the standard of living of the population.
—Ensuring rapid economic growth and improvements in
the structure of the economy.
—Raising efficiency, improving quality, and "all-
around intensification of production."
—Acceleration of scientific and technical progress.
--Reinforcing the protection of the environment.
—Perfecting the planning system.
—More efficient shaping of foreign economic relations.
(See Ref . 19, p. 146. )
The 1981 to 1985 economic plan for Soviet growth is based on
more "intensive" utilization of resources through the introduc-
tion of new technologies. This introduction of new technology
has been supported by consistent increases in research and
development funding since the early 1950 's. The Soviet 1981
Plan Fulfillment Report cited the following:
—Models of new types of machinery, equip-
ment, apparatus, instruments, and auto-
mation devices created
—Mechanized production and automation
lines installed at industrial enterprises
—Sections, shops, and production facil-
ities converted to comprehensive
mechanization and automation
—Automated record-keeping, planning,
and management systems created
Including automated managem.ent
systems for technological processes









The Plan Fulfillment Report also noted that labor pro-
ductivity grew by 2.7 percent; more than fear-fifths of the
increase in production was obtained through higher labor
productivity. [Ref. 30: p. 22] The 1981 Plan Fulfillment
Report and the 11th Five-Year Plan demonstrate the Soviet's
interest in, and need for, technological innovation. At the
same time, the Plan Fulfillment Report demonstrates one of
the major restraints i ced upon innovation and change in
th Soviet economic system—central planning.
Through history and communism, Russia is tied to a cen-
tralized planned and controlled economic system. This central-
ized control has created an enormous bureaucratic mechanism
which is not only sluggish and wasteful, but also requires com-
promise and concession throughout the system. G. Marchuk , Vice
Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology,
in discussing the importance of research programs in the 11th
Five-Year Plan, illustrates the problem-solving na ire of
Soviet research, and the complexity of the bureaucracy.
...The 170 programs of scientific and technical pro-
gress are an important component of the new Five-Year
Plan. They have been drawn up by the USSR State Plan-
ning Committee, the USSR State Committee for Science
and Technology, and the USSR Academy of Sciences, in
conjunction with ministries and departments--and , where
construction is concerned, with the USSR State Construc-
tion Committee. Among them, 41 comprehensive special-
purpose programs provide for the implementation of the
most significant scientific and technical achievements
during -he 11th Five-Year Plan. [Ref. 31: p. 22]
H toric Russian peasant culture and the Communist
ideology of the Soviet Union internally strives for the ain-
tainence of the status quo. This struggle for stability has
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fostered stagnation. All research institutions exist within
and for the state; the product of that research must serve in
support of the state's ideological doctrine. Soviet ideology
remains beyond criticism, for it remains the basis for the
existence of the regime. Any economic research contradictory
to established ideology may be altered or suppressed. Morton
Schwartz, in explaining the Soviet Union's lag in technolog-
ical development, notes that:
The continued adherence to Party orthodoxy also helps
explain the relative technological backwardness of
the Soviet economy and its slowness to change. Wedded
to a set of beliefs purported to explain all of human
history, the Kremlin rulers tend to regard all of their
economic institutions and procedures, such as central
planning, collective agriculture, and direct political
management, as necessarily sanctified by the scientific
laws of Marxism-Leninism. These practices, many of
which were actually adopted for reasons of expediency,
thus tend to become hallowed principles of a socialist
economy. They are also sustained by vested bureau-
cratic interests. Little wonder that they are so
resistant to change. (See Ref. 6, p. 14 3.)
2 . Methods of Technology Transfer
The Soviets have, in many areas, relied on the transfer
of Western technology. As a selective technology follower,
the Soviets can save research and development resources in
areas with lower national priority and apply those resources
to other areas of development. The adaptation of borrowed
Western technology to the needs of the Soviet Union involves
,
in most instances, the simplification and standardization of
machines and processes. Simplification is necessary to
accommodate the less well-trained Soviet worker, and standard-
ization is required for mass production. The copying,
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adjustment, simplification, and standardization of technology
is not comparable to true innovation. [Ref. 32: p. 207]
Reliance on Western technology has also resulted in the slow
and uneven development of a technological infrastructure,
i.e., laboratories, test facilities, and experimental pro-
duction facilities.
The transfer of technology from West to East is
accomplished through a variety of methods. The United States
Office of Technology Assessment lists five categories of
technology transfers:
1. Legal transfers made possible by the open nature
of Western society, e.g., through perusal of open
scientific literature, and NTIS documents, academic
exchange, trade fairs, etc.
2. Legal transfers of technologies which are not sub-
ject to national security controls on the CCL or
COCOM lists, and which are therefore obtained
under general license.
3. Legal transfers of technologies under an approved
validated license.
4. Illegal transfers through purchase, e.g., pur-
chases by agents, through third countries or
foreign embassies, purchases through dummy corpor-
ations, etc.
5. Illegal transfers through industrial espionage
of the theft of materials classified by the U.S.
Government. [Ref. 33: p. 77]
Faced with sluggish economic growth, Soviet leadership is
placing increased emphasis on all forms of technology trans-
fer to affect a quick fix on the economy. The Soviet
political-economy system has relied in the past on the
infusion of labor as a basic method to increase production.
Now, with a declining growth rate in the ethnic Russian
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skilled labor force, computers and robotics are fundamental
to the intensification of the Soviet economy. In both of
these fundamental areas, Soviet technology lags behind the
West. The U.S. Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Investi-
gations conducted hearings in 1982 on the transfer of high
technology to the USSR from the United States. During the
hearings, several specialists testified on the state of the
art of Soviet microelectronics, and on the means by which
the Soviets achieved their present position. William Casey,
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, reported to the
Subcommittee that:
The KGB has developed a large, independent, special-
ized organization which does nothing but work on getting
access to Western science and technology. They have
been recruiting about 100 young scientists and engineers
a year for the last 15 years. They roam the world look-
ing for technology to pick up. Back in Moscow, there
are 400 to 500 assessing what they might need, and where
they might get it--doing their targeting and then asses-
sing what they get. It's a very sophisticated and far-
flung operation. [Ref. 34: p. 351]
The extremes these Soviet activities can reach is
exampled in Appendix C, which examines two cases of illegal
technology transfer to the Eastern Bloc [Ref. 35: pp. 12-
23] . These cases demonstrate not only the extremes of Soviet
attempts to obtain Western technology, but also the diversity
of their attempts. The wide range of legal and illegal means
of obtaining technology from the West make enforcement of
controls extremely difficult.
As the above case demonstrates, the United States
Government has attempted to control the flow of high
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technology into the Soviet Union. This attempted control has
not been entirely successful, as illustrated by the following
comparison of the Soviet K-580 Series computer, and the U.S.-
made Intel 8080 Series computer:
Soviet K-580 Series U.S. Intel 8080 Series
K580IK80 microprocessor 8080 microprocessor
K580IK51 serial interface 8251A programmable interface
K580IK53 interval timer 8253 interval tiner
K580IK55 peripheral interface 8255 peripheral interface
K580IK57 DMA chip 8257 DMA chip
K580IK 59 interrupt processor 8250 interrupt controller
There is not only a similarity in the function of the chips,
but also a similarity in the numbering of the chips. (See
Ref. 34, p. 354.) It is apparent that the Soviets, in many
areas, continue to rely on borrowed Western technology. One
of the most productive methods of borrowing Western technology
is through imports. Table VI identifies Soviet imports by
product group from Western industrial countries. Considering
political restrictions to East-West trade, the table may also
identify weak areas of Soviet technology.
The structured nature of Soviet industry also serves
as a restriction to the development and implementation of
innovation and change. Industrial managers cannot plan on
the introduction of new equipment or procedures until they
appear in the Soviet economic plan. Once a new product or
process is developed and introduced, it is turned over to
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TABLE VI
Shares of Individual Product Groups in Soviet
Imports of Machinery and Transport Equipment
from Western Industrial Countries
(in percent)
Metal- Motor- Food and _, . , Timber &
_., .Year , . u • i ^ j. • -, Chemical , , , Shipsworking vehicle textile cellulose '^
1960 3.2 - 12.6 28.7 7.6 20.1
1965 4.4 - 6.2 23.4 8.0 35.0
1970 5.6 20.7 3.7 8.4 7.5 8.9
1971 6.3 6.7 3.8 14.7 5.5 7.1
1972 9.0 4.9 5.0 20.4 9.3 4.1
1973 9.9 7.5 4.1 17.3 7.8 5.7
1974 5.1 15.9 6.2 13.6 6.4 5.9
1975 2.8 7.1 5.4 9.2 3.4 8.6
1976 5.7 4.7 5.1 19.2 4.6 7.6
1977 6.1 3.9 2.9 31.4 5.2 8.2
1978 6.7 1.8 2.1 27.2 4.2 8.4
1979 6.7 3.1 2.7 27.3 3.4 7.6
Western Industrial countries: USA, Japan, Great Britain,
France, West Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria,
Finland
Source: Wolfgang Berner, et. al. , The Soviet Union 1980-81
,
p. 189.
industrial managers. The industrial manager, faced with strin-
gent production quotas, may not share the same enthusiasm
toward the introduction of the process as did its developer.
The industrial manager's reluctance to introduce new, unproven
methods of production is understandable. If the new process
or equipment does not meet the developer's expectations, it
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is the industrial manager who will bear the conseque.ices of
production shortfalls.
3. Level of Soviet Military Technology
When presented with the obstacles placed in the oath
of innovation and change by the Soviet socio-economic system,
the impressive advances in military technology appear incon-
sistent. The Department of the Navy Office of Information




— fractional-orbit ballistic missiles
—strategic air-defense interceptors
— all aspects of civil and industrial strategic defense and
recuperative planning
—tactical anti-ship missiles
--surface attack ships (excluding carriers)
— anti-aircraft artillery systems
— some armored combat vehicles
—medium- and high-altitude SAM air defense
—surface-to-surface tactical missiles
—heav -lift helicopters
The Navy also acknowledges approximate technological
parity with the Soviet in:





The Navy Office of Information further reports that:
"Relative to the popular image of unquestioned U.S. techno-
logical supremacy of the 1940 's and 1950's, it is evident that
we have not held our own against determined competition."
[Ref. 36: p. 3]
The foregoing information does not include the vast
areas of technological supremacy still maintained by the
United States. It should also be stressed that there are
estimates of Soviet superiority. There have been no direct,
conclusive comparisons made in many of the listed areas.
The assumptions are based on intelligence gathered from a
variety of sources, and, while probably accurate, they are
only estimates.
In a country that is generally accepted to be 10 to
20 years behind the West in many areas of technological
achievement, the parity indicated in military technology
demands explanation. Although the Soviet economy is less
than two-thirds of the U.S. economy, their investment in
defense spending is higher than ours. It is calculated that
from 12 to 18 percent of the Soviet's Gross National Product
is spent on defense, compared to five to six percent of
the U.S. Gross National Product. With these large expendi-
tures, the Soviet defense industry receives the best engineers
and scientists available in the system, and defense industry
workers receive higher wages than comparable workers in other
industries. Because of uneven levels of technological
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deve oment and unreliable production, the Soviet military
indu -rial complex attempts to be as self-sufficient as
possible.
This attempted self-sufficiency, combined with empha-
sis on security within the military industrial complex, thwarts
the diffusion, or spillover, of technology into other areas
of the economy. The cycle created by uneven levels of tech-
nological development accelerates the growing gao in the
technological development between the military and other
sectors of the economy.
The Soviet military industrial complex is neverthe-
less faced with some of the same restraints to innovation
and change as the rest of the economy. The military indus-
trial sector maintains the separation of research and develop-
ment, design, and production responsibilities. Soviet labor
intensive manfacturing processes and production quotas drive
designers and producers to the use of proven technology. In
J. W. Ki De and K. S. Brewer's study of Soviet weapons t cem
design, they reported that:
Soviet weapons are designed as far as possible using
on-the-shelf components. Sovie designers appear
even to accept performance penalties when standard-
ized parts cannot provide the desired performance.
Hence, American weapons systems, although in some
cases highly standardized, do not have the same
degree of standardization as is seen in the Soviet
Su-7 and Su-9 , and which uses the radar and missile
system from the Yak-28 and the engines of the same
type as that used in the MIG-21.
The standardization in Soviet weapon systems
appears to reduce system development risks and
improve producibility and reliability. However,
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it also restricts technical innovation and system
performance. [Ref. 37: p. 709]
4. Varied Level of Soviet Technology
With these inherent structural barriers to the develop-
ment, introduction and diffusion of technology, the Soviet
Union has in some areas closed the technological gap, and
in others surpassed the West. According to Ronald Amann
,
it is generally accepted that the Soviet Union is equal or
has a technological lead in the priority areas of space
exploration, aircraft, military equipment, and some sectors
of heavy industry such as blast furnaces, rolling mills, and
welding equipment. The Soviets are behind the West in chem-
icals, electronics, light industry, and construction material.
(See Ref. 13: p. 27)
The current levels of Soviet technological capabili-
ties dispel the assumption that the Soviets are totally
dependent on the West for the introduction of new technology.
B. Shcherbina, Soviet Minister for the Construction of the
Petroleum and Gas Industry Enterprises, reported that after
the sanctions imposed by the United States on pipeline
equipment:
In an unprecedentedly short time, designers and
the collectives of machine-building enterprises organ-
ized the output of Soviet-made equipment, including
gas-pumping units. Today 20 compressor stations out
of 40 have been outfitted with 16- or 25-megawatt com-
pressors made in the USSR.... It was planned to equip
33 of the 40 stations on the Urengoi-Pomary-Uzhgorod
gas pipeline with gas-pumping units purchased from
West European firms. [Ref. 38: p. 12]
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In this case it is apparent that the Soviets had the capabi-
lity to produce the equipment necessary for completion of
the pipeline. The Soviet decision to buy Western equipment
was most probably based on comparative cost rather than on
capability.
In the Ekonomicheskaya gazet ^ N. Antonov argues the
merits of Soviet-U.S. cooperation in science and technology,
emphasizing the benefits to the United States. Quoting from
testimony to the U.S. Congress by F. Press, then advisor to
the President for Science and Technology, he concluded that
the United States receives more direct advantages from cooper-
ation with the Soviet Union than the Soviets receive from the
United States. Exampled by Press' testimony that:
Experiments in magnethydrodynamics at the (Soviet)
Institute of High Temperatures have provided us with
valuable information that will help us in designing
and building our own MHD installation. We have received
from the Soviet Union wastewater-treatment technology
which, our experts estimate, would have cost $55 mil-
lion to develop. Information in the field of thermo-
nuclear fusion obtained as a result of cooperation has
saved the United States up to two years in experimental
work and about $10 million. there are similar concrete
examples in the fields of public health, ocean studies,
and space research. [Ref. 30: p. 14]
This provides further evidence that the Soviets are capable
of implementing the highest levels of new technology. It
again indicates that the development of Soviet technology
is more dependent on the State's priorities and allocation
of resources based on opportunity costs than on the lack of
specific capability.
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In recent years, the Soviet Union has only imported
between four and six percent of its total domestic investment
in plants and equipment. (See Ref. 13: p. 29) This is a
lower figure than that of any Western industrial country,
and represents, in part, the Soviets' capabilities in the
development of new technology. It is argued that it is not
how much the Soviets import, but the relative importance of
what they import. A case developed by Ronald Amann demon-
strates this point. He reports that:
It is extremely expensive to create a system for
the high voltage transmission of electric current.
This involves large expenditures on excavation, pylons,
cables, power stations, and so forth. However, the
technological linch-pins of this system are the cir-
cuit breakers, which in the Soviet case were, at one
important point in time, imported initially from
France: these may represent a relatively small por-
tion of total investment, but without them the system
would not work. Thus, dependence on these "key" tech-
nologies (possibly priced in terms of their value to
other Western countries) is not highlighted in global
statistics of machinery imports. (See Ref. 13: p. 30.)
Today the Soviet Union is credited with having the most exten-
sive and modern electric transmission systems in Europe.
It can be concluded that the Soviet Union has a
varied but real technological capability. In priority areas
such as heavy industry and the military, the Soviet Union's
technological capabilities compare favorably to the indus-
trial West, and by importing technology in these and other
areas, they have been able to save valuable resources and
development time. The United States Office of Technology
Assessment asserts that "nowhere has it been demonstrated
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that it (the Soviet Union) has obtained any technology from
the West which it could not have developed itself, given
adequate incentive and resources." (See Ref. 33: p. 76.)
While there are many constraints on the Soviet system,
the availability of research and development resources is a
major restriction to expanded progress. The importation of
Western technology has been, and will continue to be, an
effective Soviet approach in the maximization of opportunity
costs. The Soviets simply do not have the internal resources
necessary to simultaneously develop the technological capa-
bilities of all sectors of the economy. This will drive the
Soviets to the West for modern technology in efforts to bolster
their sagging economy. As noted in The Soviet Union 1980-81 ;
...one of the central factors impelling the Soviet
Union toward closer economic relations with the
Western industrial countries, namely its increas-
ing economic development problems, will certainly
not diminish in importance in the years to come.
Like its predecessors, the 11th Five-Year Plan
relies, even more than earlier plans, on technical
progress as the crucial factor to raise productivity
and ultimately generate economic growth. More than
90 percent of the increment in industrial production
is to be achieved by raising productivity. Such an
objective will lead to a continuing high demand for
modern machinery and equipment, which cannot be met
by domestic production and CMEA countries' deliveries
alone. (See Ref. 19: p. 18S',)
This outlook is supported by the unprecedented and continuous
increase in trade between the industrial West and the Soviet
Union from early 1970 to the present.
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G. SOVIET TRADE WITH THE INDUSTRIAL WEST
While the shift in Soviet trade patterns predated detente,
it took on new emphasis with the relaxation of tensions in
the early 1970's. In 1965, Soviet trade with the industrial
West accounted for only 19 percent of its total world trade.
By 1981 this trade had risen to 34 percent of the Soviet's
world trade. During the same time period, 1965 to 1981, the
share of East European trade with the Soviet Union declined
from 58 percent to 40 percent. (See Ref. 23: p. 460.)
The Soviet Union's major trading partners are East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, West Germany, Cuba,
Finland, Italy, and France. To further dominate and control
the East European members of CEMA, the Soviets have continued
the process of integrating the economies of the Socialist
countries. At the same time they have sought to expand trade
with Western Europe following their policy of "peaceful coexist-
ence." As reflected in Table VII, Soviet hard currency imports
have increased from $2,708 million in 1970, to $26,017 million
in 1980. Of special significance is the growing importance
of fuels to Soviet hard currency exports. In 1970, they
exported $493 million in fuels, or 22 percent of their total
hard currency exports. In 19 80, export of fuels amounted to
$15,095 million, or 64 percent of the Soviet Union's hard
currency exports. Figure 3 shows that spiraling world oil
prices, rather than increased volume, account for this tre-
mendous increase in the hard currency export of fuels.
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TABLE VII
Soviet Hard Currency Trade















,201 7,835 23,489 2,708 14,257 26,017
Fuels 493 3,887 15,095 8 497 700
Crude/petro 387 3,276 12,028 8 497 700
Natural gas 13 220 2,706
Coal & coke 93 391 362
Machinery 140 560 1,388 927 4,503 6,039
Ferrous metals 129 167 246 279 2,567 3,469
Chemicals 67 256 765 208 742 1,565
Wood & product 365 712 1,476 84 214 203
Agricultural 205 572 478 615 3. 56 8,800
Grain 22 3 101 2,323 4,400
Other 183 569 478 514 1,533 4,400
Consumer goods 76 215 152 260 436 745
Source: U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, "Soviet
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The trade patterns of West Germany, France, and Italy
with the Soviet Union are generally representative of the
Western European trade with the USSR. West Germany is one
of the Soviet Union's most important Western trade partners.
In 1981, West German-Soviet trade accounted for 15 percent of
Western imports, and 21 percent of Western exports. Of this
trade, fuels accounted for 77 percent of Soviet exports to
the Federal Republic of Germany, while manufactured goods
made up 71 percent of West German exports to ~e Soviet Union.
Table VIII further delineates West German traae with the USSR.
_<ike West German trade, French trade with the Soviet Union
has steadily increased, with an annual growth rate of about
25 percent between 1970 and 1980. In 1981, French-Soviet
trade amounted to 12 percent of Soviet trade with the indus-
trial West. Again fuels, at 83 percent, accounted for the
largest import item from the Soviets, and -machinery and e'uip-
me /:t made up the largest part of French e orts to the Soviet
Union. Table IX capsulizes French Soviet trade.
In the early 1970 's, Italy was in the forefront of expand-
ing East-West trade, but as more technologically advanced
markets in West Germany, France, Japan and the United States
opened up, Soviet-Italian trade became less important. In
1981, Italy supplied the Soviet Union with about 5.5 percent
of its imports from the industrial West. Italm imports from
the Soviets c unted to about 14 percent of th.. Soviet Union's
exports to the industrial West. Fuels once again led Soviet
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TABLE VIII
West Germany: Trade with the USSR, 1981
Percent of





































Source:U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, "Soviet













France: Trade with the USSR, 1980
Percent of
Commodity Million Total to Worldwide
USSR
French Exporto
Total 2,464 100.0 2.2
Food and Agriculture 622 25.2 3.4
Energy 16 .6 .3
Chemicals 599 22.7 4.9
Metals 379 15.4 2.5
Iron and steel 359 14.7 3.6
Machinery and transport — 681 27.6 1.7
Manufacturers 150 6.1 1.1
Minerals 19 .8 .7
Wood and paper 38 1.6 1.1
French Imports
Total 3,556 100.0 2.6
Food and Agriculture 42 1.2 .3
Energy 2,722 76.5 7.6
Coal 85 2.4 4.7
Crude oil 1,585 44.6 6.1
Oil products 578 16.2 13.8
Chemicals 385 10.8 3.7
Metals 68 1.9 .5
Iron and steel 1 neg. neg.
Machinery and transpc t — 5"^' 1.7 .2
Manufacturers 133 3.7 .9
Minerals 11 .3 .3
Wood and paper 134 3.8 2.2
Source: U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, "Soviet
Economy in the 19 80 's: Problems and Prospects, Part 2," p. 466,
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exports to Italy at 85 percent of the total exports, and
manufactured goods led Italian exports to the Soviet Union.
A breakdown of Soviet-Italian trade is provided in Table X.
TABLE X
Italy: Trade with the USSR, 1981
Percent of























Source: U.S., Congress, Joint Economic Committee, "Soviet






















In lese th ^e exampl Soviet trade with the est can
be seen as important in selective industries, but not critical
to the economic well-being of the nation. To insure this
trade activity is in the proper perspective, it must be noted
that in percentage of worldwide trade, it accounts for only
1.9 percent of West German exports, 2.2 percent of French
exports, and 1.7 percent of Italian worldwide exports. In
jobs, this equates to between 100,000 and 150,000 in work
forces that total ^tween 20 and 25 million. The importation
of fuels from the Soviets, which accounts for seven to nine
percent of each country's total energy needs, could prove
to be a viable economic lever if alternative supplies cannot
be guaranteed.
Even in the wake of Afghanistan and the Polish crisis.
Western Europe has maintained the regional detente that had
been established with the Soviet Union. Western Europe has
continued to relax into deeper and deeper trade ties with
Moscow. The Soviets proudly report the increased East-West
European cooperation, citing the following 19 83 trade develop-
ments :
The Soviet Union is conducting the closest and most compre-
hensive trade and economic, as well as scientific-technical
and industrial, cooperation with the countries of Western
Europe. Commodity turnover with them in 19 8 3 was 6.4
percent greater than in 1982. The Western European countries'
share in all Soviet trade with industrially developed capi-
talist countries rose from 79 percent in 1982 to 82 percent
in 1983.
In 1983 Western European countries continued to cooperate
with Soviet organizations in construction of industrial
projects in the USSR. They delivered machinery and
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equipment to the Soviet Union for certain enterprises of the
chemical, metallurgical, pulp and paper, light and food sec-
tors of industry, the building materials industry, the gas
transport network, and the agro-industrial complex.
In addition, foodstuffs and consumer goods were imported
from the countries of Western Europe. The large volume of
export contracts signed by Western European companies with
Soviet organizations led to a significant increase in the
volume of Soviet imports from countries of this region; it
increased by 11.3 percent compared to 1982. As a result of
this, the share of Western European countries in USSR imports
from the developed capitalist countries rose from 62 percent
in 1982 to 70 percent in 1983.
There were significant increases in deliveries of goods to
the Soviet Union from Spain (50.2 percent), Austria (47.1
percent), France (36.3 percent), the Netherlands (36.2 per-
cent), Ireland (29.8 percent), Norway (41.8 percent). West
Berlin (38.9 percent), Greece (26.3 percent), Italy (17.5
percent, Iceland (15.5 percent), and the FRG (14.7 percent).
In payment for imported goods, the Soviet Union exported to
Western European countries energy carriers, raw materials,
and various types of machinery and equipment which they needed,
The FRG has been the USSR'S leading foreign trade partner
among the Western countries in recent years. Trade with the
FRG rose 5.9 percent compared to 19 82. From the FRG the
Soviet Union buys about one-fourth of all machinery and equip-
ment imported from the capitalist countries, a large quantity
of pipe and certain sections of rolled ferrous metals, as
well as consumer goods. Natural gas, petroleum, and petro-
leum products have an important place in Soviet exports to
this country. West German companies also import Soviet
chemical products, lumber, ores, machine tools, electrical
motors, motor vehicles, and other industrial goods.
Promising directions for deepening trade and economic coop-
eration between the two countries are detailed in agreements
on the development of economic, industrial, and technical
cooperation, and on further development of economic cooper-
ation, which last year were extended to 199 3.
Trade-economic, industrial, and scientific-technical cooper-
ation with Finland is being developed on the firm foundation
of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assist-
ance, which last year was extended for the next 10 years,
and trade-economic agreements, including the Long-Term Pro-
gram for Economic Cooperation, which is calculated to 1995.
The Protocol on Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture and
Food Production will help develop cooperation with this
country further. It covers practically all the stages
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of the production and marketing of agricultural products
and foodstuffs.
^ Trade with Italy rose 8.5 percent compared to 1982. The
Soviet Union exported energy carriers and other goods
needed by Italy. A broad assortment of machinery and tech-
nical goods were imported from Italy. The contract for
production in the USSR of small agricultural equipment
should be especially noted. It was signed with Italian
companies last year. The intention of both parties to
expand and diversify trade-economic relations in the
future was reflected in the new long-range program agreed
upon in 19 8 3 for deepening economic, industrial, and
technical cooperation in the period until 1990.
-Soviet-French trade was developed actively in 1983. Its
volume rose by 16.6 percent compared to 1982. Deliveries
of energy carriers, which make up 86 percent of Soviet
exports to France, increased. Imports of French goods,
mainly agricultural products and industrial equipment,
were substantially expanded. Supplies for development of
the fuel and energy complex were a significant share of
imports from France in 19 83. In particular, a large order
was placed last year for delivery to the Soviet Union of
equipment for gas cleaning and refining at the Astrakhan
gas condensate deposit.
Total commodity turnover with certain Western European
countries such as Spain (68.6 percent) , Ireland (30.6 per-
cent, Sweden (17.7 percent), and Great Britain (16.0 per-
cent) increased significantly in 1983. [Ref. 40: pp. 4-6]
The Soviet Union's traditional exports of fuel and raw mater-
ials remain as the mainstay of their exports. Over 45 percent
of all Soviet exports in 1983 were in these catagories. (See
Re f . 40: p . 8 .
)
The Soviet Union has continually tried to improve the
level of its industrial exports. Most products are of such .
poor quality that they are not competitive on the world market.
Soviet-built cars and tractors, which are considerably less
expensive than Western competition, have lost favor because of
numerous defects and a lack of spare parts and repair facilities,
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[Ref. 41; p. 44] Table XI illustrates detected faults in
tests conducted on the Moskvich 412 automobiles.
TABLE XI
Frequency of Detected Faults























Engine/cooling 2 8 2
Fuel/exhaust 1 1 2
Transmission 2 2 2 2
Braking system 1 3 15
Steering mech 15 3 11
Suspension/wheels 3 11 3 4
Body 14 4 1
Miscellaneous 6 . 3 1





. al. , The Technological Level
H. DUAL USE OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
With consistently increasing East-West trade has come
consistently increasing levels of technology transfer. Accord-
ing to Wayne Schroder,
the COCOM embargoed list had already been substan-
tially reduced from 265 items in 1954 to 149 items
in March 1976. However, the growth of COCOM excep-
tion requests was so great that by 1978, 1,035 such
requests were granted (in 1977, according to a report
by the Office of Technology Assessment, 836 COCOM
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exception requests were approved; only 31 were denied) :
nearly half of these requests (500) were made by the
United States. [Ref. 42: p.. 61]
Schroder goes on to provide some of the more obvious examples
of the detrimental effect of dual-use technology transfer,
citing the following:
—The 1972 sale of 164 Centalign-B precision grinding
machines to the USSR. These machines, denied to the
USSR in 1961, have been identified by Defense Intel-
ligence Agency officials Edwin Speaker and Jack Vorona
as having made a major contribution to the Soviet ICBM
effort by enabling them to produce the precision minia-
ture ball bearings needed to improve the Hard-target
kill capability of MIRV guidance systems , including
the heavy SS-18.
--Kama River Truck Plant. The transfer of assembly
lines, foundries, molding machines and relevant com-
puter technology to the Kama River Truck Plant project
in the 1970 's is another key example. These transfers,
facilitated by direct, low interest export/import bank
loans, were made despite DoD warnings that Kama could
be used to manufacture military vehicles. By 1979,
government officials testified before the House Armed
Services Research and Development Subcommittee confirm-
ing that vehicle production and diesel engine produc-
tion were being diverted for use in the Soviet military.
Finally, conclusive proof of diversion came with acknowl-
edgement by Undersecretary Perry in February 1980 that
Soviet trucks manufactured at Kama were sighted in
Afghanistan.
— ZIL. Soviet ZIL truck plants are not only important
from a manufacturing standpoint, but also as a center
for research for the entire Soviet automotive industry
(particularly the Moscow plant) . Military vehicles
manufactured at ZIL plants include the ZIL 131 mili-
tary truck, missile launchers and armored personnel
carriers. Computer and spare parts sales to ZIL have
been major sources of technology transfers in the past.
According to Brady, the United States had exported
$12-13 million worth of computers and spare parts to
ZIL factories.
— Oil and Gas Technology. In Fall 1978, the Carter
administration approved some 74 export licenses for
the sale of oil and gas exploration and drilling
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technology to the Soviet Union. The most important
sale was the one involving the export of $144 million
oil drill bit factory by Dresser' Industries to the
USSR. A Defense Science Board Task Force, Secretary
of Energy Schlesinger and members of the National
Security Council all recommended against the Dresser
sale, on grounds that it would ease Soviet energy
requirements, thus freeing resources for use in the
military sector; that its computerized electron beam
welding machine could be used to manufacture jet air-
craft, and that the tungsten carbide used to produce
the drill bits could be used to manufacture armored-
piercing projectiles. Former National Security Council
member Samuel P. Huntington has noted that it has
been estimated that Soviet oil production would be
- 10-15 percent less than it is, were it not for Western
exports of oil and gas equipment and technology to
the USSR. (See Ref. 42: pp. 62-63.)
It is obvious from these examples that the transfer of military
and dual-use technologies can adversely affect the military
position of the West and its allies. However, similar tech-
nology is available throughout the industrial West.
It must therefore be noted that to be effective, any
policy on East-West trade and technology transfer must be
accepted by all members of the alliance; it is futile to
embark on a policy in this area that is not fully supported
by all Western industrial countries. The weaknesses inherent
in the use of economics as a political lever against the
Soviet Union were vividly demonstrated by President Carter's
failed grain embargo, and President Reagan's ineffective
embargo of pipeline equipment. According to some sources,
this equipment was available from over 300 other suppliers
in Western Europe.
With Western Europe's voracious appetite for trade with
the East, any policy adopted that severely restricts individual
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members of the alliance will undoubtedly prove unacceptable.
Considering the East European's and the Soviet's varied but
real internal technological capabilities , the fundamental
emphasis on a Western trade and technology transfer policy
should be directed at the protection of emerging technology
with close military applications; any extension of this policy
will in all probability prove to be unworkable and counter-
productive. "In a global economy of physical scarcity/'
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said to the Sixth Special
Session on the United Nations General Assembly in April 1974,
"science and technology are becomming our most precious
resource." [Ref. 43: p. 1] The export of this resource
from the United States to the Soviet Union is mired in politi-
cal, strategic, and economic uncertainty.
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IV. SOVIET THIRD WORLD TRADE
A. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MOTIVATION
Like trade with the West, the Soviet Union's motivation
for expanded trade with the Third World is based on both
economic and political gain. In Soviet terms, they see
opportunities for expanding mutually beneficial economic
cooperation with the newly free countries of the old colo-
nial and neo-colonial empires in light of the developing
countries' desire for independence, and the economic growth
of the Socialist countries. Through this beneficial cooper-
ation, these newly freed countries which are developing their
society and political parties as well as their economies will,
in the Soviets' view, "welcome with understanding the policy
pursued by the Soviet Union and the Socialist's community
as a whole, and will actively promote friendship and cooper-
ation with them." [Ref. 44: p. 251] The Soviets profess
that the Third World countries are their natural allies
against the neo-colonial United States.
Moscow has placed special emphasis on the extension of
their power and influence in the Third World. They see the
inevitable collapse of the neo-colonial system as a prelude
to the collapse of capitalism. As Karen Brutents , a leading
Soviet Third World expert, has pointed out:
For the Soviet Union, relations with the newly
free states are particularly significant because of
71
the historic role these relations have played and
continue to play in liberating these countries from
colonial and neo-colonial oppression, in consolidat-
ing their independence, and ensuring their economic
sovereignty. This is also connected with the community
of similarity of the vital interests and goals of the
Socialist and newly free countries in international
relations. In today's world, expanding relations
with the newly free countries is one of the Soviet
Union's principal foreign policy objectives. (See
Ref. 44: p. 239.)
To meet this foreign policy objective better, the Soviets are
expanding their economic relations with the Third World. The
Soviet apparatus can be particularly effective in making
immediate decisions to supply military equipment, and economic
aid or to engage in barter deals, depending on the political
expediency of the moment. [Ref. 45: p. 83]
The significance of the Soviet Union's capabilities and
methodical movement into the international marketplace should
not be underestimated. The Soviet Union has the second largest
gross national product in the world. Through the effective
integration of the East European economies , beginning in the
mid-1960 's, the Soviets now control a giant economic machine
named the CMEA. According to economist Bhedan Oszuprowicz,
in 1978 the gross national product of the CEMA member countries
was 2 3.2 percent of the world GNP , compared to the United
States' 21.8 percent share, and the European Economic Commu-
nity's 20.2 percent share of world GNP. (See Ref. 45: p. 55.)
As the Soviet Union exhausts its supplies of unrecoverable
natural resources, it will by necessity compete with the West
in the Third World for those products. Today, the Soviet
Union remains essentially self-sufficient in most minerals,
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and can selectively enter markets based on opportunity cost,
or political expediency. This selective capability is' in
stark contrast to the dependent nature of Western Europe,
Japan, and the United States on Third World markets for many
essential items. In Lenin's view, the fundamental weakness
of the capitalist system was its dependence on the colonies
and the developing world. The road to London stretched through
New Delhi and Peking in 1920, as the road to Washington now
stretches through South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and
Mexico.
B. U.S. -THIRD WORLD TRADE
The importance of foreign trade to the United States national
economy had remained small until the end of World War II. The
defeat of Nazi Germany in Europe, and the defeat of Japan in
the Pacific left the economy of the United States in an expanded
condition in search of new outlets for production. These out-
lets were found in both Europe and the former colonies of the
now-dismantling old European empires. Post-war American
policy was directed toward the ideal of free trade and a steady
expansion of capital investment and consumption. Even the
"backward" nations, through a slow evolutionary process, could
eventually support capital-intensive industry. For the United
States, more trade meant more jobs, lower prices, and higher
incomes
.
The United States' push for free trade and new markets '
to accept our overproduction after WWII was successful. By
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1960, the United States' annual import-export trade was $35
billion, and mushroomed to $507 billion by 1981, making the
United States the largest trading nation in the world. Our
initial need for trade after World War II has developed into
a dependence on trade.
In 1981, the United States imported $273 billion worth of
goods, nearly one-fifth of the raw material that we consumed.
These imports included chromium, cobalt, industrial diamonds,
and, of course, petroleum products. The disruptive and crip-
pling effects of the 1973 OPEC oil embargo vividly demonstrates
the United States' dependence on foreign trade, especially
Third World trade. Increasingly more important, but much less
visible, is the United States' dependence on the Third World
for strategic and critical minerals. A 19 80 report by the
Subcommittee on Mines and Mining of the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives states that:
America is now dependent on foreign sources in excess
of 50 percent for 24 of 32 minerals essential to
national survival. Minerals such as manganese - essen-
tial in the production of steel (import dependence 98
percent) ; cobalt - vital hardener and strengthener of
steels (import dependence 95 percent) ; and chromium -
indispensable to the production of stainless steels
and the least substitutable of all ferro-alloys (import
dependence 90 percent) reveal a vulnerability more
serious than the energy crisis. While America may
develop its own alternative energy resources , in many
cases there are no substitutes for the minerals im-
ported from foreign sources , countries which are often
unstable at best, hostile at worst. (See Ref. 3: p.
VII. )
The distribution of important minerals and energy sources
among Third World countries indicate that in many areas, the
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United States and the Soviet Union's dependence on trade with
the Third World will continue to increase. Table XII shows
the distribution of selected mineral and energy sources by
groups of countries.
TABLE XII
Distribution by Groups of Countries of the World
Output of Selected Mineral and Energy Sources






















Note: Petroleum and Natural gas in Coal-equivalent
Source: [Ref. 46: p. 9]
The table clearly indicates that both the West and the
Eastern bloc will become increasingly dependent on the Third
World for most of the commodities listed. The United States'

















































rationale in the necessary maintenance of trade with the Third
World for economic well-being rather than in the desire to
increase markets. Correspondingly, the import lead trade
policies of the Soviet Union will, through necessity, require
an upward adjustment of exports to meet increased imports from
the Third World.
Current United States policy stresses that increased trade
is the most important force in promoting the economic growth
of the less-developed countries. For most less-developed
countries, trade, rather than official aid, is the main source
of foreign exchange, and the primary external factor in econ-
nomic progress. The ability of the less-developed countries
to buy the goods they need for their development is dependent
to a large extent on expanding their exports. (See Ref. 46:
pp. 1-2 .
)
One method of increasing exports is through direct foreign
investment. But with the rash of civil wars and expropriation
in the Third World during the period 1950 into the 1980 's,
U.S. investors were reluctant, and remain reluctant, to make
long term investments in what is still an unstable area.
United States businessmen are not only concerned with the
dangers of war and expropriation in the Third World, but also
the level of a country's external debt, balance of payments,
domestic investment, domestic competition, labor unrest,
exchange controls, U.S. regulatory requirements and many
more things, all of which have added disincentive and uncer-
tainty to U.S. business investment in the Third World. [Ref. 47:
pp. 17-22]
^g
Combining with these economic strains is the success of
the United States' past foreign economic policy in rebuilding
of the West European and Japanese economies after IWII. This
success is now seen by American industry in the form of stiff
foreign competition in traditional United States markets.
European and Japanese quotas, tariffs, barriers, and direct
government subsidies have caused American business to call
foul, and have advocated similar United States governmental
measures. Robert B. Reich, writing in Foreign Affairs noted
that :
The European Community maintains a tariff of 17
percent on integrated circuits. Australia, South
Africa, Spain, Mexico, and 26 other nations require
fixed percentages of domestic content in automobiles
assembled within their borders. France is restrict-
ing imports of video tape recorders by subjecting them
to detailed inspections and deliberate delays. Some
government subsidies are being devoted to older in-
dustries. Over the last five years, the European
Community has invested more than $30 billion in steel.
Other subsidies are being directed at emerging busi-
nesses. In 1982, Japan unveiled two programs that
together devote $750 million to pursuing world leader-
ship in developing and producing the next generation
of computers. Japan's $200 million project to develop
very large-scale integrated circuits already has enabled
that nation to take the lead in that field. France is
spending $20 billion on electronics over the next five
years; Germany and France together are investing heavily
in satellite technology. [Ref. 48: p. 784]
In response to these pressures, the United States Govern-
ment has, while still a proponent of free international trade,
countered with many of the same protectionest techniques used
by other industrial and developing countries. The United
States, for example, reimposed duties on $3.8 million worth
of imports from Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Brazil, and
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Mexico, as well as increasing protection of U.S. -made car parts,
electrical goods, fertilizers, and chemicals. [Ref. 48: p^
785]
Faced with these strong competitive forces in the interna-
tional marketplace, the gradual emergence of the Eastern bloc
as a new player with new rules will continue to place additional
strains on the present system of international trade. In a
weakened world economy with many already strained economic
and political relations, this new competitive force could
break more than 35 years of relatively positive economic coop-
eration and free world trade. The economic disruption of a
trade war would undoubtedly weaken the United States far
more than the traditionally economic independent Soviet Union,
and serve to drive Third World economies closer to the Eastern
bloc.
C. RECENT SOVIET-THIRD WORLD TRADE
The closed nature of Soviet society prevents a full and
complete assessment of all the rationale involved in Third
World trade relations. Whether recent Soviet trade develop-
ments represent state economic decisions based on opportunity
cost, or attempts to disrupt free trade and deny the West
access to former markets, is an important question. Whatever
the answer, their actions represent Soviet movement into Third
World markets, at the competitive expense of the United States.
In 1983, the Soviets reported trade with 144 countries,
and specified that 102 of these trading partners were developing
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countries. [Ref. 49: p. 12] Appendix D lists selected
countries' trade with the Soviet Union in 1982 and 1983.
It demonstrates the relative Soviet trade growth and influence
in those countries. This partial listing of Soviet trade
involvement illustrates not only the degree of Soviet economic
involvement, but also in the case of Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iraq,
Iran, and others, the Soviets' search for new sources of energy
Soviet foreign trade shifts in Iran, while certainly demon-
strating an increasing presence since the United States'
departure, may also be an indication of Soviet shifting support
to Iran from Iraq in those two countries' continuing conflict.
Such use of economic power to influence the political events
in another country is, of course, not in keeping with the
Soviet Union's declared policy.
The Soviet Union constantly stresses that its interest in
trade with Third World countries is based solely in the
interest of mutual benefit. A recent article in the Moscow
news stated that:
...the policy of the Soviet Union rules out any
attempts to use economic cooperation for imposing
its will on any other country, or to seek advantages
for itself in the economic difficulties other states
are experiencing. This is incompatible with the
principles of USSR foreign policy, and with the
interests of peace, international seucrity, and the
strengthening of friendly relations. [Ref. 50: p. 43]
Yet in 1948, Yugoslavia's oil imports from the Soviet Union
were cut by 50 percent, and stopped completely with Tito's
break from Moscow. In 1956, Soviet oil shipments to Israel
were halted with their invasion of the Sinai. In 1958, Soviet
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oil shipments to Finland were stopped until a President more
in line with Moscow's policies was installed. With the surfac-
ing of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the mid-1960' s, oil ship-
ments to China were halted. And in 1968, oil shipments to
Cuba were delayed when Castro became too independent. [Ref.
51: p. 139]
Soviet sources point out that they had governmental agree-
ments with 64 developing countries in 1980, compared to 54
in 19 75. Such cooperation was maintained with 21 countries
in Asia, 33 in Africa, and 10 in Latin America. In terms of
volume, the USSR's economic and technical cooperation with
the developing countries, provided by the agreements signed,
rose by 760 percent between 1960 and 1980, including a 570
percent growth in aid to Asian countries, and a 1,200 percent
growth in aid to African countries. This incredible growth
in Soviet economic and technical cooperation can, in part,
be explained by events in Vietnam, Kampuchea, Afghanistan,
Angola, and Ethiopia.
Deliveries of Soviet complete plants to the developing
world rose from 6 3.6 million rubles in 1960, to 794 million
in 1980. Under agreements, the Soviet Union helped the devel-
oping countries to build more than 1,190 industrial and other
projects— 600 had been completed and put into operation as of
January 19 81. [Ref. 52: p. 13]
Soviet economic cooperation with the developing countries
embraces a wide range of industries and economic sectors, but
concentrates on industrial development. (See Ref. 44: p. 253.)
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Table XIII demonstrates the type of projects in which the
Soviets are engaged. Typically the recipient country is
required to make payments for the project by supplying the
Soviet Union with a portion of the facilities production, or
by supplying traditional goods. Soviet aid is thereby used
to boost trade.
TABLE XIII
Total Production Capacity of Cooperation Projects







Power station mln . kw 19.37 7.3
Pig iron mln .ton 26.95 10.77
Steel 1 26.10 9.73
Rolled stock 1 21.68 7.47
Iron ore 1 13.00 13.00
Coal (production) 1 50.27 4.80
Oil 1 66.00 66.00
Oil (refining) I 23.00 11.60
Bauxites 1 2.50 2.50
Mineral fertilizer 1 0.105 0.105
Land irrigation
and drainage thoijs ha 738 156
Railroads km 2,099 1 ,709
Highways km 2,105 2 ,085




The following reported trade protocol between the USSR




Last December a Protocol on Trade Turnover between
the USSR and the Republic of India for 19 84 was signed
in New Delhi. The Protocol provides for a 10 percent
trade growth above volumes agreed for 19 8 3 through the
expanded shipments of traditional export and imports
and additions of new goods to the trading list. In-
creased shipments to India of a number of Soviet goods
is planned; they include machinery and equipment, fer-
tilizers, newsprint.
Soviet main imports from India will include cotton
fabrics, jute articles, raw material and semi-manufac-
tures for the tanning and footwear industries , knitwear
and clothes as well as tea, coffee, tobacco, spices,
and other agricultural produce.
The Protocol envisages greater Soviet purchases of
Indian national industry's products such as cable
articles, electronic instruments and components,
equipment for the dairy industry.
The volumes of many Soviet and Indian goods coor-
< dinated in the Protocol for 1984 considerably exceed
the figures for 1984 in the 1981-1985 Long-Term Trade
Agreement, which, taking into consideration the results
achieved in mutual trade during the 1981-1983 period
will ensure the successful implementation of the
Agreement. (See Ref. 52: p. 5.)
Additional examples of Soviet Third World economic and mili-
tary aid are provided in Appendix E [Ref. 53: pp. 194-204]
.
The Soviet Union's expansion of Third World trade has
been assisted by foreign-based Soviet firms established to
promote Soviet products and services. The number of these
firms grew from only 28 in 1970, to 84 by 1976. (See Ref.
45: p. 84.) To facilitate these firms in their goal to
increase trade , the Soviet merchant marine has grcwn to become
the largest in the world in number of ships. The Soviet Union
has over 1,700 ocean-going cargo ships, and is tied at sixth
place with the United States, which has 500 merchant ships,
in total carrying capacity. The Soviets have directed the
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development of their merchant fleet toward relatively small
multipurpose tankers, and high-speed Roll/on Roll/off com-
bination ships. This development enables the Soviets to
compete effectively in Third World countries which have less-
developed and shallower port facilities. Additionally, the
Soviets do not participate in shipping conferences which
establish rate structures and are able to undercut the set
schedules by 20 percent or more. (See Ref. 45: p. 84.)
This provides added incentive for Third World countries to
participate in trade with the Soviets. The Soviet Union's
large merchant fleet is extremely valuable in their expanding
trade ties with the Third World, and is effective projection
of Soviet influence.
D. THIRD WORLD DEBT
The current Third World external debt and trade deficits
have also strengthened and assisted the Soviets' entry into
many formerly closed Third World markets. While Mexico, Brazil,
and Argentina lead the world in total external debt, other
Third World nations are not far behind. Foreign debt has
become the controlling factor in many Third World economies.
Faced with high interest rates, high import costs, and low
commodity prices, many nations are finding it more and more
difficult to service their national debt. As more hard cur-
rency is needed for this purpose, less is available for imports
and capital investment. One solution which is gaining in
popularity among Third World debtor nations is the use of
counter-trade to increase exports and imports.
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Indonesia was the first Southeast Asian nation to institute
a counter-purchase policy in January 1982. Counter-purchase
or counter-trade is somewhat different from straight barter.
Usually only part of the agreement is in the form of direct
exchange of goods, and often there is more than one country
involved in the transaction. In Indonesian policy, a 100
percent counter-purchase was required on all non-oil or gas
products purchased overseas, with a 50 percent penalty against
unfulfilled obligations [Ref. 54: p. 49]. This stiff
counter-trade policy met with initial resistance in Japan and
other countries, but negotiated agreements have been reached
which satisfy all parties. In 1982, Malaysia also accepted
counter-trade as a "useful method of trading with East Eur-
opean countries." [Ref. 55: p. 50] Agreements have been
reached for the exchange of Malasian rubber and petroleum
for two South Korean-built naval vessels, palm oil for PaJci-
stan railway equipment, and Mexican cocoa beans for rubber
(see Ref. 55 : p. 52 )
.
Thailand has thus far limited its barter trade to the
exchange of Thai farm products for agricultural-production
materials. Its first formal barter agreements were with the
Soviet Union, Romania, and South Korea, exchanging maize and
tapioca chips for fertilizer. [Ref. 56: p. 52] At one point
in the recent Thai-U.S. negotiation on the purchase of F-16's,
it was suggested that at least part of the purchase be paid
for in commodities. The Philippines, faced with the same debt
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problems and low commodity prices as others, has been utiliz-
ing counter-trade with the Soviet Union and other East European
countries in the export of coconuts and sugar.. They are
currently negotiating payments for a proposed one million
ton-a-year coal-fired cement plant with the Soviets. It is
reported that:
Moscow is Manila's largest buyer of sugar. The Phil-
ippines has been trying to negotiate long term contracts
with the Soviets for some time (at present, most pur-
, chases are done on a ship-by-ship basis). Existing
long term contracts with futures brokers have been the
saviour of the sugar industry locally during the cur-
rent price depression, though these will expire at the
end of the year. If counter-trade negotiations for the
cement plant contain a sugar component, the local indus-
try may breathe easier, and the Soviets will have their
first major industrial project within Asia. [Ref. 57:
p. 54]
It is currently estimated that counter-trade comprises 20
to 30 percent of all world trade [Ref. 58: p. 55] . This
figure will undoubtedly grow as long as the current world
economic slowdown continues, interest rates remain high, and
commodity prices stay low. Runaway inflation, as high as
1,000 percent a year in some Third World countries, also
destabilizes traditional free trade and encourages counter-
trade. The admitted inefficiencies and trade disruptions
created by counter-trade will be accepted because there is
no present alternative. The Soviet Union and other CMEA
countries which have experience and have established infra-
structure to handle the demands of counter-trade will benefit
the most from its continued growth.
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E. SOVIET MILITARY AID
With increased trade and aid, the Soviet Union is expanding
its influence in the Third World. The importance of the econ-
omic base in the Soviets' thrust into the Third World will
continue to grow. It is needed to balance and stabilize the
military aid given to Third World countries. Economic assist-
ance provided by the Soviet Union is now dwarfed by the military
assistance. Figure 4 graphically demonstrates the continuing
disproportionate reliance of the Soviet Union on military arms
supply to the developing states. Kremlin leaders recognize
that while economic integration will foster long term stable
relationships, what is needed to support Third World military
coups is military aid. Soviet international problems specialist
G. E. Mirsky wrote in 1976 that:
In 'the past 15 years alone, about 30 countries
have produced approximately 40 successful military
coups. This shows that military intervention in the
politics of a country in the Third World has become
the usual practice. In a lot of countries of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America, power falling into the
hands of soldiers is not an exception--it has become
the rule.
But until the beginning of the 1960 's, our scien-
tists were not studying it; only recently have these
social forces become an object of study because their
social impact on the life of the country has become
quite clear. (See Ref. 11: p. 73.)
Commonly in Third World revolutionary situations , the
immediate needs of a new government, fearful of internal and
external threats, are satisfied by Soviet military assistance.
Immediate military aid is often essential to a new regime's
continued survival. Similar assistance from the United States,
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a status quo power often aligned with the previous government,
is unlikely. Additionally, the acceptance of Soviet military
aid, by a new regime, will in itself often malign United States'
political leaders, making U.S. political and economic assistaMce
more difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.
The structure of Soviet heavy industry with its emphasis
on the industrial-military complex provides the Soviet Union
with a comparative advantage in the production of military
hardware. While the economy is not well-suited to satisfying
consumer demands, its stress on heavy industry is ideal for
the production of conventional military hardware (see Ref. 51:
p. 119). With this comparative advantage, the Soviets are
able to capitalize on the hard currency sale of arms to many
oil-rich Middle Eastern countries. Figure 5 shows that the
Middle East imported 41.9 percent of the total world arms trans-
fers. Since 1977 the Middle East has led all other regions in
arms imports. Soviet arms imports to the region were led in
1982 by Iraq with $4.3 billion, followed by Libya at $2.4
billion, Syria with $2.3 billion, and Algeria with $1.1 billion
of imported Soviet arms (see Ref. 12: p. 7).
Soviet military assistance combined with Marxist-Leninist
ideology and a centrally controlled governmental system gives
added assurance to the maintenance of power by revolutionary
leaders. While a vanguard party and massive military assist-
ance go a long way in establishing Soviet influence, it is
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that nations are reliably bound to the Soviet Union. The
mechanics of this integration is found in the Council of
Mutual Economic Assistance. Eastern Europe, Cuba, and Vietnam
give testament to this bond.
F. CURRENT DEVELOPMENT
The United States and the Soviet Union's dependence on
Third World countries for the importation of vital raw materials
can only increase with time. This growing dependence is ines-
capable if current levels of production and standards of living
are to be maintained. It has been estimated that the United
States imports over a quarter of the raw material used in
production, and that the Soviet Union imports in excess of 11
percent of its raw materials for production. (See Ref. 51:
p. 131.)
Direct economic and military aid from the United States
Government is shackled with administrative requirements and
often specifically directed at narrowly defined areas. The
central control of the Soviet Union enables the immediate
and complete committment of military and economic assistance
to a Third World country. Soviet motivation for Third World
assistance does not require public deliberation or public
support. Former President Richard Nixon offered this assess-
ment of Soviet motives in South Africa and the Third World
in general.
If the USSR continues to succeed in its penetra-
tion of Africa, it will have come a long way in its
larger strategy of encircling the world "city—of
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cutting off the industrialized West from the resources
without which it cannot survive. Even the resource-
rich United States depends heavily on imports for several
of the basic minerals vital to modern economy. Chromium
offers an example of the hidden dangers of this dependency.
Most people, when they think of chromium, think of
the fancy trim on automobiles. But to strategic planners
chromium means such things as ball bearings, precision
instruments, and missiles. A single jet aircraft re-
quires more than 3,600 pounds of chrome. As one expert
has put it— "If you don't have chrome, you don't have
top quality aircraft engines." Stainless steel cannot
be made without chromium. The National research Council
recently concluded that the U.S. long term vulnerability
'in chrome is greater than in petroleum. Chromium is
already in short supply, and we desperately need it to
rebuild our armed forces. Our domestic supplies of
chromium ore are small in quantity and low grade in
quality; 92 percent of our chrome must be imported.
And our two principal sources have recently been
South Africa (33 percent) and the Soviet Union (25 per-
cent. Furthermore, of the world's known resources of
chromium, 96 percent are in South Africa and Zimbabwe.
This vital dependency illustrates why the Soviets have
particularly targeted for interference that portion
of the continent that intensely engages the emotions
of many in the West: southern Africa. The Soviet
Union seldom acts without a purpose, and its purposes
are always strategic, never moral.... By one authorita-
tive estimate, the Republic of South Africa alone
possesses a tenth of the world's asbestos, three-
fourths of the world's chromite ore, more than half
of its platinum group metals, half of its gold, a
third of its diamonds: a mineral treasure of almost
incalcuable strategic and economic importance.
If South Africa were to fall under their (the
Soviets) control, they would control the sealanes
around the Cape, through which 70 percent of the stra-
tegic raw materials, and 80 percent of the oil needed
by European NATO powers flow. South Africa is also
the continent's leading economic power. It alone
provides 40 percent of the industrial production of
all Africa, and 25 percent of its agricultural pro-
duction. [Ref. 59: p. 6]
President Nixon's assessment of the Soviets' motives and
the import dependence of the United States is strengthened
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by recent reports that the Soviet Union is now purchasing
lead, copper, zinc, aluminum, molybdenum, and petroleum in
large quantities. Yet the Soviet Union is self-sufficient
in all these items. The Soviets have also reduced exports
to the West in nickel, vanadium, lead, manganese, chrome
ore, asbestos, and platinum (see Ref. 59: p. 6). Again
whether these Soviet actions represent a state economic
decision based on opportunity cost or an attempt to deny
the United States access to these minerals is an important
question. Whatever the answer, their actions represent the
Soviets' movement into Third World markets, at the competi-
tive expense of the United States.
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V. CONCLUSION
A. CONTINUING NEED FOR TRADE
The Soviet Union will maintain its economic and trade ties
with the Western industrial countries and ejxpand these rela-
tions with the Third World. The Soviet Union's growing trade
relations have proven both economically and politically advan-
tageous. They have effected the continuation of regional
detente in Western Europe, which enables Soviet access to the
latest technology from West Germany, France, Sweden, Italy
and Great Britain. They will continue to foster Third World
trade to obtain raw materials, grain, energy products and
markets. Since the early 1970 's, the Soviets have emphasized
the "international division of labor" as one of the principal
means to enhance the economic well-being of the Soviet Union
(see Ref. 11: p. 85). In his summary report to the XXV Con-
gress of the CPSU, Brezhnev said:
One of the characteristics of our age is the use
of the international division of labour to develop
each country to an increasing degree, no matter how
much wealth nor what the economic level. We are
devoted, as are other countries, to using foreign
economic relations in order to mobilize greater
potential for the smooth and successful completion
of economic tasks and to increase the effects of
greater productivity and speed up technical progress.
(See Ref. 11: p. 85.
)
This represents the second major shift in the Soviet's
outlook on the world economy since the death of Stalin. In
Stalin's time, the world economic system was viewed as
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consisting of two separate economic systems , which could only-
clash with each other. Under the leadership of Khrushchev,
the idea that there were two separate systems continued, but
competition between the systems could exist under the conditions
of "peaceful coexistence." The ideological evolution of
Soviet economic thought shifted again with Brezhnev in the
early 1970 's. With the maturation of his concept of interna-
tional division of labor there exists one world economic system
with two subsystems—the socialist world economy and the capital-
ist world economy. Interaction between these two subsystems
is desirable when it contributes to the strength of the Soviet
Union. (See Ref. 11: pp. 83-84.) The binding autarkic shackles
of Stalin's foreign economic policy were thus loosened under
the leadership of Khrushchev, and thrown off with Brezhnev's
ideological shift to the international division -of labor.
These shackles still lay at the feet of Kremlin leaders,
restricting a dynamic leap into world markets.
The continued expansion of Soviet world trade will not go
on unabated. There are limits to the Soviets' capability to
foster increased trade. These limits come from within the
Soviet political-economic system itself, and from their Western
and Third World trading partners.
B. TRADE LIMITS FROM WITHIN THE SOVIET SYSTEM
Through history and communism, Russia is tied to a central-
ized planned and controlled economic system. This centralized
control has created an enormous bureaucratic mechanism which
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is not only sluggish and wasteful, but also requires compromise
and concession throughout the system. In addition, the Com-
munist ideology of the Soviet Union internally strives for
the maintenance of the status quo. This struggle for stability
has fostered the economic stagnation of the Soviet Union which
restricts increased world trade.
The Russian cultural fear of things foreign, and their
paranoic security concerns fostered by countless foreign
invasions, also serves to restrict the dynamic entry of the
Soviet Union into world trade. Their preoccupation with the
military industrial complex, its security and self-sufficiency
thwarts the diffusion, or spillover, of technology into other
areas of the economy. The cycle created by uneven levels of
technological development accelerates the growing gap in the
technological development between the military and other
sectors of the economy making many Soviet finished products
unacceptable in the world market. With these inherent struc-
tural barriers to the development, introduction, and diffusion
of technology, the Soviet Union has in some areas closed the
technological gap, and in others surpassed the West. (See
Ref. 13: p. 27.)
The current levels of Soviet technological capabilities
dispel the assumption that the Soviets are totally dependent
on the West for the introduction of new technology. In the
case of the U.S. embargoed pipeline equipment, it is obvious
that the Soviets had the capability to produce the equipment
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necessary for completion of the pipeline. The Soviet decision
to buy Western equipment in this instance was based on oppor-
tunity cost rather than on capability. This provides further
evidence that the Soviets are capable of implementing the
highest levels of new technology. It again indicates that
the development of Soviet technology is most dependent on the
State's priorities.
In recent years, the Soviet Union has only imported between
four and six percent of its total domestic investment in
plants and equipment (see Ref. 13: p. 291. This is a lower
figure than that of any Western industrial country, and repre-
sents, in part, the Soviets' capabilities in the development
of new technology. The uneven nature of Soviet technology
serves as an incentive to increase high tech imports from
the industrial West, and as disincentive to the export of
Soviet finished products. Therefore, in the near future,
the Soviet Union will have to rely on their traditional ex-
ports of fuel and raw materials for the mainstay of their
exports. Over 65 percent of all Soviet exports in 1983 were
in these categories (see Ref. 40: p. 8).
The Soviets will continually try to improve the level of
its industrial exports. Most products are of such poor qual-
ity that they are not competitive in Western markets. In
Third World markets, these industrial exports oftentimes
compete with products from other developing nations. This
Soviet-Third World competition is not conducive to the
expansion of Soviet world trade.
96
The present and major emphasis for the continued economic
growth of the Soviet economy in the 11th Five-Year Plan is
the intensification of existing resources through the intro-
duction of new technology. This emphasis itself demonstrates
a system unwilling to accept real change or reform in the
centralized control and management of the economy. Many West-
ern and some Soviet specialists suggest that the Soviet's
economic system needs real change in the form of decentralized
control, yet they continue on the same familiar path, attempt-
ing to bolster the system by better, more stringent control,
and the introduction of new technology.
The consistent lack of success in the current Five-Year
Plan will undoubtedly place additional stress on the Soviet
system. With continued reduced growth rates, downward adjust-
ment of capital investment, military expenditures, more consumer
goods will be required. If the Soviet socio-economic system
continues in its resistance to change, the historical burden
of this reduced economic growth will fall on the shoulders of
the people.
Almost 20 years ago, a leading Soviet Party official wrote:
The resolution of many economic problems now fac-
ing our country requires a further increase in the
well-being and culture of the working peoole , an
increase in the material and cultural benefits offered
them by society. Naturally it is possible, based on
the revolutionary enthusiasm and high consciousness
of the people, and on their internationalism to conduct
matters in the course of a relatively brief historical
period so as not to raise the living standard, but at
the same time to engage in successful economic con-
struction. But no kind of high-consciousness permits
the transformation of such a situation into a permanent
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state. The economic laws will inevitably prove to
be stronger; they will begin to take revenge, they
will revenge themselves in a thousand ways, and in
the end there will be a drop in labor productivity
and a slowing down of economic development . CSee
Ref. 6: p. 153.)
Given the apparent tolerance of the Soviet people with
their faith and support in the government, it is not reason-
able to assume that any fundamental changes will evolve from
the economic slowdown in the Soviet Union. The Soviet people
are an integral part of a system afraid of change.
A critical reevaluation of economic policy may emerge
from a continued decline in economic growth, but a shift in
economic priority from the military sector to the consumer
sector seems inconceivable in the face of a U.S. arms buildup.
The Soviets have stated that:
The Soviet Union and its allies— the Socialist
community countries--cannot overlook the facts of the
imperialists' buildup of their military arsenals.
They have to pay due attention to defense. The USSR
Supreme Soviet session deemed it expedient to main-
tain Soviet military spending in 19 83 at the absolute
1982 level, although, of course, it would be prefer-
able to reassign if only some of these resources to
the peaceful sections of the economy, where there is
a very great need for expanded investment. Unfortunately,
such an opportunity is at the present time lacking.
It is ruled out by the imperialist policy of arms
race with the candidly proclaimed purpose of securing
military superiority and at the same time achieving
the "economic exhaustion" of the socialist and other
peace-loving states. [Ref. 60: p. 11]
From this statement it is obvious that Soviet leaders will
continue with their military buildup at the expense of the
consumer sector. In doing so, they will continue to tax
what is seen as an already overburdened system, with military




C. EXTERNAL TRADE RESTRAINTS
The major hard currency sales of the Soviet Union have
been energy, military arms, and gold. Price increases of
these items will, in all likelihood, be modest from the mid-
1980 's into the 1990 's. In 1983, there was a 15 percent
decline in the world price of oil, and this market has remained
relatively stable. In 1984, Soviet oil production fell for the
first time since \<IVI11 , and some experts see this trend con-
tinuing into the 1990 's. To maintain hard currency imports,
the Soviets have, in the past, increased their exports of oil
and natural gas. In the immediate future, this may no longer
be an option available to Soviet leaders. [Ref. 61: p. 52]
Reduced oil prices will also restrict the purchase of Soviet
military hardware by Middle East oil-producing countries.
Additionally, the price of gold has generally moved with infla-
tion. When inflation rises, so does the price of gold; when
inflation falls, the price of gold has also decreased. Since
many countries are coming to grips with their inflation prob-
lems, it is most probable that the price of gold will remain
relatively constant into the next decade. Thus, Soviet earn-
ings from the sale of gold will remain at their present rate,
or decrease slightly. The future is less than promising in
all three major areas of hard currency export. [Ref. 62: pp.
57-58]
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D. PROJECTION OF SOVIET WORLD TRADE
It is most likely that these restraints on the Soviet
Union will serve to reduce the volume of East-West trade
through the 19 80 's and into the 19 90 's. At the same time,
Soviet Third World trade, particularly trade with grain and
oil-producing Third World countries, will continue to increase.
The striking inevitability of direct U.S. -Soviet economic
competition for the natural resources of the Third World is
at hand. The economic war Soviet Premier Khrushchev called
for will be fought in the Third World. The expansive nature
of the Soviet military machine and their ability to use the
force of proxies suggests that the fight may not remain purely
economic.
E. UNITED STATES POLICY OPTIONS
By definition, economics is an integral part of strategy
in both war and peace. Yet a long range, consistent, and
effective United States trade policy vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union and the Communist bloc has not been developed. The
formation of a policy to deal with the economic intrusion
of the Communist bloc into world trade requires a consensus
on the effects of such trade. This consensus must be pre-
ceeded by a consensus on the Soviet threat in general.
In view of the diversity of opinions on the Soviet
threat within the United States, the industrial West, let
alone the Third World, such agreement is unlikely. Without
the agreement and cooperation of other world leaders,
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options for U.S. policymakers are limited. Unilateral economic
sanctions by the United States aimed at the Soviet Union have
proven ineffective. Almost any product supplied to the Soviets
by the United States can be obtained from other sources
:
technology from West Germany, France, Japan, etc.; and grain
from Canada, Australia, Argentina, and Brazil. The inter-
dependent nature of trade additionally requires an accurate
assessment of the domestic consequences of trade limitation,
as well as an analysis of the obtainable goals of any pro-
posed restrictions.
With these limitations, the best United States policy-
makers can strive for is agreement within the industrial West
to restrict, from the Soviet Union, emerging technology with
close military application and favorable credit arrangements.
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APPENDIX A
COLLAPSE OF THE CAUCASUS OILFIELDS— 19 20
(extracted from Antony C. Sutton, Western Technology
and Soviet Economic Development ISlT^-igSQ
, pp. 16-17)
The Caucasus oilfields are a major segment of Russian
natural resource wealth. Baku, the most important field, was
developed in the 1870 's. In 1900 it was producing more crude
oil than the United States, and in 1901, more than half of
the total world crude output. The Caucasus oilfields survived
the Revolution and Intervention without major structural damage
and became a significant factor in Soviet economic recovery,
generating about 20 percent of all exports by value, the larg-
est single source of foreign exchange.
Caucasian fields require continuous drilling to maintain
an oil flow from producing wells. Therefore, oil production
in this area is directly proportionate to the amount of drill-
ing undertaken. Before the Revolution, drilling averaged in
excess of 35,000 feet per month, and had been as high as
50,000 feet in Baku alone.
The Bolsheviks took over the Caucasus in 1920-21, and
until 1923, oilfield drilling almost ceased. During the first
year of Soviet rule, "...not one single new well has started
giving oil," and even two years after Soviet occupation, no
new oilfield properties had been developed. In addition, deep-
ening of old wells virtually ceased. As a result, water
percolated into the wells, and the flow of crude oil became
first a mixture of oil and water, and finally a flow of oily
water.
AVERAGE MONTHLY DRILLING IN RUSSIAN OILFIELDS, 1900-1921
1900 1913 1920 1921




Drilling records are an excellent indicator of the state
of oilfield maintenance, development, and production. The
complete collapse after the Soviet takeover is clearly sug-
gested in the above table. In 1300, Russia had been the
world's largest producer and exporter of crude oil; almost
50,000 feet of drilling per month had been required of Baku
alone to maintain this production. By early 1921, the aver-
age monthly drilling in Baku alone had declined to an insig-
nificant 370 feet or so C . 7 percent of the 1900 rate)
,
although 162 rigs were in working order. This drilling was
concentrated in only eight holes due to lack of steel pipe.
The result was that by 1922, half of the Baku wells were
idle, and the remainder were producing increasing quantities
of water. In the Grozny field, a greater portion of the wells
were idle; only eight were in process of drilling, and the Old
Grozny section was completely shut down. Smaller fields at
Emba and Kuban were in similar chaos; both had received exten-
sive drilling in 1915; consequently, there were 40 to 50
producing wells in 1922, but no new or maintenance drilling
was in progress.
The reasons for the catastrophic decline in oilfield pro-
duction were four. First, the number of available oilfield
workers declined from about 40,000 in 1915, to less than
10,000 in 1920-21; coupled with this was the growing techni-
cal inefficiency of the remaining workers. Second, there
was a breakdown in railroad transportation, and a decline in
pipeline capacity because of lack of maintenance. Third, new
oilfield supplies and equipment, including repair facilities,
were almost nonexistent. Last, there was a breakdown in the
oilfield electrical supply system. One of the largest Baku
powerhouses, for example, had 22 watertube boilers; none were
in operation in 1922.
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APPENDIX B
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY NOTE ON PIPELINE EQUIPMENT EMBARGO
(Text of the European Community Protest Note of
12 August 1982 to the U.S. State and Commerce
Departments on the Export Administration Regulations
Issued by the United States on 22 June, Affecting
Equipment for the Soviet Gas Pipeline.)
Source: Charles Maechling, Jr., "Argiiments Against the
Pipeline Embargo," Europe , September/October, 1982, p. 6.
The European Community wishes to draw attention to the
importance that it attaches to the legal, political, and
economic aspects of the United States' measures, including
their impact on the commercial policy of the Community. As
to the legal aspects, the European Community considers the
U.S. measures contrary to international law, and apparently
at variance with rules and principles laid down in U.S. law.
As to the political and economic aspects, it is clear
that the U.S. measures are liable to affect a wide variety
of business activities while their primary purpose is to
delay the construction of the pipeline to bring Soviet gas
to Western Europe. The European Community holds that it is
unlikely that the U.S. measures will in fact delay materially
the construction of the pipeline or the delivery of the gas.
The pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe can be com-
pleted using Soviet technology and production capacity
diverted from other parts of their current program. Further-
more, the recent U.S. measures provide the Soviets with a
strong inducement to enlarge their own manufacturing capacity
and to accelerate their own turbine and compressor develop-
ments, thus becoming independent of Western sources. Gas
could still flow to the Community starting as scheduled in
1984 owing to the existing pipeline system, sufficient to
cover the requirements of the early phases of the delivery
program.
One of the main elements of the Community's policy of
reducing the vulnerability of its energy supply is based on
diversification of sources. Gas from the Soviet Union will
help to conserve the Community's own stock of gas, oil, and
other fuels, and will reduce the Community's reliance on
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dangerous dependence on that source. Even when gas is flow-
ing at the maximum rate, in 1990, it will represent less
than that four percent of the Community's total energy
consumption.
Whatever the effects on the Soviet Union, the effects on
European Community interests of the U.S. measures, applied
retroactively and without sufficient consultation, are un-
questionably and seriously damaging. Many companies interested
as subcontractors, or suppliers of components, have made invest-
ments and committed productive capacities to the pipeline
project, well before the American measures were taken. Though
they may use no American technology, they will suffer complete
loss of business if the European contribution to the project
is blocked. Some of these companies may not survive. Major
European companies that can survive the immediate loss of
business, will, nevertheless, suffer from lower levels of
capacity utilization and loss of production and profits, while
workers will be laid off temporarily or permanently.
In the longer term, the European Community companies may
be damaged by the disruption of their contracts concluded in
good faith, because they may cease to be reliable suppliers
in the eyes not only of the Soviet Union, but also of their
actual and potential business partners in other countries.
One inevitable consequence would be to call in question the
usefulness of technological links between European and
American firms, if contracts could be nullified at any time
by decision of the U.S. administration. Another consequence
to be feared is that the claim of U.S. jurisdiction accom-
panying U.S. investment will create a resistance abroad to
the flow of U.S. investment. Thus, these export control
measures run counter to the policy aims of the United States
of easing the transfer of technology and of encouraging free
trade in general. There will be other far-reaching effects
upon business confidence. These measures thus add to the
climate of uncertainty that is already pervading the world
economy as a whole.
The European Community therefore calls upon the United
States authorities to withdraw these measures.
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APPENDIX C
ILLEGAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER CASE STUDIES
Source: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental
Affairs, "Transfer of United States High Technology to the
Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc Nations," November 1982, pp.
12-23.
CASE NO. 1: HOW SOVIETS EQUIPPED SEMI-CONDUCTOR PLANT WITH
U.S. MACHINERY
The CTC-Maluta case came about when a syndicate of elec-
tronics companies was set up in Western Europe and Southern
California by a 34-year-old West German named Werner J.
Bruchhausen. Several of Bruchhausen ' s Southern California
enterprises had the initials CTC , and all were managed by
his principal American accomplice, Anatoli Maluta, also
known as Tony Metz, a Russian-born naturalized American
citizen.
Using Burchhausen ' s companies and accomplices in Western
Europe as freight forwarders and transshipment points , Maluta
sent more than $10 million in American-made high technology
equipment to the Soviet Union from 1977 to 1980. Much of
the machinery was used to equip a Soviet plant for the manu-
facture and testing of semi-conductors. The equipment went
from California to Western Europe to the USSR.
To Dr. Baker, the CTC-Maluta case proved his point that
the Soviets know precisely what U.S. technology they want;
they leave little to chance. Dr. Baker said, explaining:
Of particular interest to me in the (CTC-Maluta)
case is the information it gives us about Soviet in-
tentions. We delude ourselves if we think the Soviets
enter the black market in search of strategic compo-
nents in a helter-skelter style, buying up dual-use
commodities without rhyme or reason.
The truth of the matter is that the Soviets and
their surrogates buy nothing they don't have specific,
well-defined needs for. They know exactly what they
want--right down to the model number—and what they
want is part of a carefully crafted design.
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The carefully crafted design in this instance, Dr. Baker
said, was the semi-conductor manufacturing plant, an essential
part of the Soviets' desire to close the technical gap between
themselves and the U.S. in the intergrated circuit/micro-com-
putor industry.
Dr. Baker, who testified in the 1981 successful prosecu-
tion of Maluta and his associate, Sabrina Dorn Tittel, said
he studied 400 separate air waybills and other shipping docu-
ments used by the CTC network. He said the conclusion was
inescapable that the Soviets were equipping a semi-conductor
plant. He said the Soviets' use of components of U.S. origin
demonstrated their determination to make the facility as effi-
cient and modern as any in the world. He explained:
,... (the Soviets) have purchased clandestinely all the
hardware they need for equipping a good intergrating
circuit production plant. They showed no interest in
purchasing production equipment that was not state-of
the-art. They showed very good taste.
Stressing his point that, through the CTC-Maluta combine,
the Soviets bought everything they needed for a semi-conductor
manufacturing plant. Dr. Baker testified that among the equip-
ment they bought over the period 19 77 through 19 80 were saws
for cutting silicon crystals, equipment for making masks for
intergrated circuit design, diffusion ovens for circuit pro-
duction-implantation systems for circuit production, photo-
lithographic systems for intergrated circuit production
,
scribers for separating intergrated circuits on wafers, testers
for testing intergrated circuits on wafers, bonding equipment
for bonding connecting leads to intergrated circuits , and
packaging equipment for packing the circuits. Dr. Baker went
on to say:
High quality for intergrated circuits are the
basis of modern military electronics. Intergrated
circuits form the basis for military systems which
are more flexible, more capable, and more reliable
than systems using discrete electronic components.
The production tooling and equipment obtained by the
Soviets (from the CTC-Maluta network) will signifi-
cantly improve the Soviets' capability to produce
such circuits.
Further support for the assertion that the Soviets relied
on American technology for equipping of their semi-conductor
plant came from John D. Marshall, a chemist and specialist
in the operation of facilities that manufacture semi-conductors
Marshall, who owns a high-technology business in that
section of Santa Clara County, California known as the
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Silicon Valley, testified that in the winter of 1975 he made
two trips to the Soviet Union.
Led by a West German named Richard Mueller to believe
that the Soviets wanted to retain his consultative services
in connection with their plans to manufacture electronic
watches, Marshall learned on his second trip to Moscow that
what was actually desired of him was his expertise in equip-
ping a semi-conductor plant, Marshall told the Subcommittee:
On the second trip, we met several Soviets who
purported to be technical people. They were not
very well-trained, and were not famil'iar with sophis-
ticated technological thinking. But it was apparent
to me by the questions they asked and the subjects
they discussed that the Soviets had built a semi-con-
' ductor manufacturing and assembly plant and they were
anxious to equip it.
They wanted American semi-conductor manufacturing
equipment, and they had detailed literature on the
precise kind of equipment they wanted. They also
wanted me to obtain for them certain semi-conductor
components
.
It was clear to me that Mueller had deceived me
as to the Soviets' intentions; that it was not merely
electronic watches the Soviets wanted to manufacture.
Marshall said he realized that for him to cooperate any
further with the Soviets would have constituted questionable
or illegal conduct on his part. He said he refused to meet
further with the Soviets and left Moscow.
As he returned to the United States, Marshall began to
recall recent conversations he had overheard that at the time
had not made sense to him, but now were becoming clear. Tra-
veling to Moscow, for example, Marshall and Mueller had
stopped over in Hamburg where Mueller introduced him to a
Canadian, whose name he could not remember, who made remarks
to the effect that he also was providing technical assistance
to the Soviets; that his mission was to show them how to make
intergrated circuits, and how to use properly equipment they
would be obtaining.
In Moscow, Marshall said, he met a woman who spoke English
with a German accent, who was planning to ship certain Amer-
ican-made photolithography materials to the Soviet Union via
East Berlin. Photolithography materials are critical in
semi-conductor manufacture. Marshall could not remember
the woman ' s name
.
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The significance of 197 5 as being the year in which the
Soviets expressed their desire for American-made semi-conductor
equipment was explained by Marshall. He said in 19 75 the U.S.
was preeminent in the field of semi-conductor technology. He
said:
It is my view that the Soviets had built their
manufacturing plant, or plants, to specifications
for American-made equipment—for the manufacture
,
assembly, and testing of intergrated circuits. Now
that the facilities were constructed, they were in
the winter of 19 75, confronted with the next step,
which was to equip the facilities.
Marshall said that the Soviets ' primary interest in equip-
ment in 1975 related to the manufacture and assembly phase of
semi-conductor production. By 1977, he said the Soviets would
have been ready to stock the facility with the test equipment;
with software development equipment.
Dr. Lara Baker, in his testimony before the Subcommittee,
said his knowledge of the sequence of events in the purchase
of the semi-conductor equipment squared with Marshall's. In
the 1978-79 timeframe. Dr. Baker said the CTC-Maluta syndi-
cate was purchasing production equipment. In the 1979-80
period, the CTC-Maluta network was buying semi-conductor test
equipment. Marshall's testimony "is quite consistent with my
information," Dr. Baker said.
CASE NO. 2: POLISH SPIES COMPROMISED RADAR EXPERT WILLIAM
HOLDEN BELL
The Subcommittee examined the William Holden Bell/Marian
Zacharski case as an instance in which Soviet bloc spies
,
working out of a Polish-owned company in the United States
,
cultivated and then compromised an American defense industry
engineer, and obtained from him significant amounts of secret
military information.
Burdened with debts and back taxes, family tragedy, and
a job with no future, William Holden Bell needed a friend.
Bell, a 60-year-old Hughes Aircraft radar engineer, found
such a companion in 30-year-old Marian Zacharski, who lived
near Bell and his young Belgian wife, Rita, in the Cross
Creek Village apartment complex in Playa del Ray in Los
Angeles Country.
Testifying before the Subcommittee, Bell said he knew
Zacharski to be a Polish national, and the West Coast manager
of the Polish-owned machine manufacturing firm, Polamco,
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incorporated in Delaware and Illinois, with, offices in Chicago,
Detroit, and Los Angeles. But, Bell s^id, he was not concerned
about the national security problem in his association with
Zacharski , believing that the Soviet bloc spies sought to
inject themselves into the lives of defense industry engineers
like himself only in Europe and other foreign places. "When
you are sent to Europe, you are told to expect attempts by
foreign spies," Bell testified, "but whoever expected it to
happen here at home?"
Bell and Zacharski played tennis on a daily basis. With
their wives, they met socially. Zacharski "slowly became my
best friend," Bell recalled, noting also that the Polish
manufacturing executive had a liberal expense account and
used it generously. Bell said Zacharski asked him to make
a few contacts for Polamo sales. Bell did, and without
advance notice, Zacharski paid him $4,000. In addition,
Zacharski told Bell he might be needed as a consultant for
Polamco once he retired from Hughes,
Looking toward farther employment with Polamco, Bell
said he tried to demonstrate to Zacharski his own profes-
sional competence, and showed him a document he had prepared
at Hughes Aircraft on a sensitive military subject. Bell
said the document was classified secret, and that though he
gave it Zacharski on the tennis court, his Polish friend took
it home to read.
At this stage of his relationship with Zacharski, Bell
said, he justified his own conduct on the theory that Polamco
was just like any other industrial company in the United
States which used gratuities and other forms of payoffs to
obtain company secrets from competitors. Bell explained:
An engineer for one company is interviewed by
the management of another. Considerable benefits
•are dangled in front of the engineer in terms of
increased earnings and better positions. He is asked
to produce samples of his work, and this is normally
done without regard to their security classification.
Sometimes the engineer is hired. More often he is not.
This is generally tolerated because, of course, both
companies are American. And they are in competition
with each other.
Bells' s initial perception of Zacharski as just another
foreign business executive was enhanced, he said, by the fact
that Zacharski, by virtue of his Polamco credentials, had
access to government facilities, such as atomic energy
installations and naval shipyards.
Under the pretense of helping Bell buy his apartment in
the complex that was being converted indo condominiums,
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Zacharski began giving cash, payments to the Eughes engineer.
Bell testified:
In view of my prospective employment by Polamco>
he CZacharski), thought he could help me. Subsequently,
he appeared at my door handing me envelopes of cash.
With this money I made the downpayment on the condcroin-
ium and paid the Internal Revenue Service. I signed
a receipt for the money and concealed the source from
my wi fe
.
Bell began photographing sensitive documents he brought
home from Hughes. He went to Inssburck, Austria, and met
with more Polish agents. His expenses on this trip, and three
others— to Insbruck again, to Lintz , and to Geneva—were paid
by Zacharski. The agents were not guessing about Bell's
worth to them, Bell said, explaining: "They knew exactly what
they wanted, right down to the company identification numbers."
Before he was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, Bell had received a total of $110,000 over the 3-year
period from 1977 to 1980. The CIA report to April 1982
entitled, "Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology," received
as Exhibit No. 1 at the hearings, said that Bell gave the
Polish agents more than 20 highly classified reports on
advanced future United States weapons systems. The CIA said
the Polish government "probably" gave the reports to the
Soviet Union.
The CIA said that among the classified reports Bell turned
over to the Polish spies , those of prime importance to the
United States included: The F-15 Look-Down/Shoot-Down radar
system, the quiet radar system for the B-1 and Stealth bombers,
an all-weather radar system for tanks, an experimental radar
system for the U.S. Navy, the Phoenix air-to-air missile, a
towed-array submarine sonar system, a new air-to-air missile,
the improved HAWK surface- -to-air missile and a NATO air-
defense system. The CIA went on to say:
The information in these documents put in jeo-
pardy existing weapons and advanced further weapons
systems of the United States and its Allies , The ac-
quisition of this information will save the Polish
and Soviet Governments hundreds of millions of dol-
lars in R&D efforts by permitting them to implement
proven designs developed by the United States and
by fielding operational counterpart systems in a
much shorter time period. Specifications on current




Bell, convicted of espionage and serving an eight-year
prison sentence, blamed no one but hJLjnself for his conduct,
but he did say that a more effective internal security system
at Hughes Aircraft might have pinpointed him as a potential
security risk. He said it was well-known among his coworkers
in the office that his finances were in disarray, that he was
being pursued by the IRS, and that he had filed for bankruptcy.
It also was apparent that he might have harbored deeply felt
resentment against the company for which he had worked for 30
years, but which, at this late date in his career, had "shunted
(me) off to a guiet back room. " Bell said his own security
clearance with Hughes had not been reviewed in 2 8 years. More-
over, Marian Zacharski and his firm, Polamco, were known to
the FBI, and his association with Bell should have triggered
more interest. Bell said.
Bell said FBI agents told him that Marion Zacharski was
known by national security authorities to be a "highly trained
Polish intelligence officer" when he came to the U.S. in 1977.
Zacharski was placed under surveillance "the day he arrived
in the United States, and when he arrived in California, he was
under continuous surveillance there," Bell said.
Convicted of espionage, Zacharski was given a life sentence,
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APPENDIX D
SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE 19 8 3
(in rubles)
1982 1983




Afghanistan turnover 691,0 675 ,2
export 412,5 401,0
import 287,5 274,2
Bangladesh turnover 54,9 83,7
export 27,6 50,1
import 27,3 33,6
Vietnam turnover 1010,7 1139 ,0
export 804,2 904,1
import 206,5 234,9
India turnover 2514,0 2332,6
export 1040,2 1271,6
import 1473,8 1051,0
Indonesia turnover 53,8 53,8
export 34,4 22,2
import 19,4 36 ,1
Jordan turnover 90,7 68,0
export 90,5 67,6
import 0,2 0,3
Iraq turnover 994,1 753,9
export 975,9 371,4
import 18,2 382,5
Iran turnover 766,0 936 ,5
export 577,3 599,2
import 188,7 377,3
Yemen Arab turnover 34,4 41,8




















































































































































Source: FBIS, USSR Report, "International Economic Rela-



































TYPICAL SOVIET/THIRD WORLD ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID
(The following has been adapted from John L. Scherer, ed,
USSR Facts & Figures Annual, Vol. B, pp. 194-204.)
Soviet Economic Assistance to Eastern Europe Cmn $)
Year TotalAssistance












Source: CIA-DIA Estimates. U.S., Congress, Joint Economic
Committee, "Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and
China." (Mimeo, 1983), DIA, 46.
TYPICAL SOVIET THIRD WORLD ECONOMIC AID
—Algeria: The Soviet Union and Algeria signed an economic
protocol in March 19 83. It may lead to the construction of
three rolling mills, cement plants, the working of several
mineral deposits, and the construction of railways and pipc:?lines
—Argentina: The Salto Grande hydroelectric power station
with a capacity of 1.89 MW has gone into operation. Plants in
Leningrad and Karkov supplied the generators , turbines and
regulators
.
—Bangladesh: The third unit of the Gorsal thermal power
station (210,000 kw) will be commissioned at the end of 1984.
The fourth will be commissioned in 1987, bringing the station
to its designed capacity of 530,000 kw.
-Brazil: The USSR helped design and construct the Sobra-
dinho hydroper station. It began operation in 1982, using
six Soviet generators.
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—Cuba: The USSR and Cuba have signed a protocol for the
extraction of oil from Varadero-Cardenas and Galiano-Matanzas
.
The U.S. Department of State has estimated that the USSR gave
Cuba $4.7 billion in economic aid in 1982, and $25 billion
over the past seven years.
--Egypt: More than 100 Soviet experts are working in Hulwan,
Naji Hammadi, and at the cement factory in Asyut. Special-
ists were to do maintenance work on electric power station
turbines at Aswan in April 1983. There are currently 15 pro-
jects of bilateral cooperation.
—Grenada: About 12 Soviet science teachers arrived in
Grenada in September 1983.- Some 400 to 600 technicians were
working on the island. Many were building a new international
airport. A ground station in the Intersputnik network was to
be constructed.
--India: The USSR and India signed a protocol 13 June 1983
to expand oil cooperation. The Soviets will send additional
teams to carry out seismic surveys in the Cambay offshore
area and the West Bengal State. They will determine whether
surveys should be conducted in southern India ' s Cauveryhore
Basin and the Himalayan hills. Seismic surveys will be made
in Tripura. Two Soviet teams have put six oil wells and one
gas well back in operation in Gujarat. India denied a report
in the Hindustan Times of a secret delivery of Soviet uranium
to Delhi in May, 1983 for the Rajasthan AES at Kota. India
receives heavy water under the 1976 agreement. the USSR is to
supply 256 tons of heavy water. About 131 tons had arrived by
the end of 1982. About 400 Indian technicians have been
trained in the Soviet Union, and almost 5,000 at their work
places by Soviets. The USSR and India signed a protocol in
September, 1983 to blast hills in the Singrauli coal field in
Madhya Pradesh. A plan to develop the Godavari coal field
will be prepared.
— Iran: More than 3,000 Soviet technicians have been involved
in economic projects since 1981. Nineteen railway crews with
locomotives control Iranian transport. Some 30 KGB officers
train Savama agents, the Iranian secret police. Business Week
(15 Aug 1983), p. 46, reports that more than 50 percent of the
Soviet personnel in some projects are KGB operatives. Some
100 industrial, agricultural and other units are currently
being built with Soviet assistance.
--Iraq: The Hadita hydroelectric power station (570 MW) is
under construction. Stations built with Soviet assistance
account for more than 25 percent of Iraq's total electricity.
These stations are Badjibija (thermal, 200 MW) , Nasiriya
(thermal, 840 MW) , and Dokan (hydro, 400 MW)
,
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--Libya: Work on the gas pipeline from Al-Buraythah to
Misureta is nearly completed. An iron and steel complex will
be guilt at Misureta. In 1981, Soviet specialists prepared a
soil map for an area of about 3.5 million hectares. The Soviets
have been invited to participate in a water diversion project
involving subterranean water from the inland regions.
--Madagascar: A 255-km highway from Ambetabe through Mahanoro
to Marolambo is planned.
—Mongolia: The USSR has helped Mongolia build a radio relay
line over 2,000-km long from Ulaanbaatar westward. Another
line will be built to the east. The Erdenet copper mining and
concentrator project has been commissioned ahead of schedule.
--Nicaragua: Two hydraulic engineering schemes are being
designed by the Soviets for Nicaragua. Bulgaria and the
Soviet Union are helping build a port, a drydock, and a satel-
lite station. A deep-water port at El Bluff at the entrance
to Bluefields Bay would end Nicaragua's dependence on the
Panama Canal. The $125 million El Bluff project would move
goods by river to Rama, 35 miles .from the port, then by roads
inland. The Soviets will put a drydock at San Juan del Sur,
the Pacific port to be used for the tuna fleet. A satellite
telecommunications station is planned outside Managua. The
USSR will help Nicaragua for at least seven years.
—Nigeria: The first phase of the Ajokuta Metallurgical
Plant, the largest in tropical Africa, was commissioned in
July 1983. It has a basic oxygen furnace, but Nigeria lacks
good coking coal for the furnace.
--North Korea: A cold-rolling shop was commissioned at the
Kim Chaek Metallurgical Combine at Chongjin in early 1983.
An oxygen converter and a hot-rolling shop have already been
constructed under an agreement to increase the capacity of
the plant by 1 million tons of steel.
—Peru: Soviet experts helped design the Olmos hydropower
and irrigation system. The design incorporated a provision
to divert the flow of rivers from the Atlantic to the Pacific
side of the Andes through a 20-km tunnel. Approaches to power
engineering have changed frequently in Latin America, accord-
ing to the Soviets, and these changes have delayed cooperation.
--Syria: The USSR and Syria signed a protocol 23 May 1983
to develop Syria's first nuclear power station. The protocol
includes plans for geological testing and the construction of
a 220 kV high-tension line. The Hims-Damascus railroad became
operational in March. Moscow and Damascus signed an agreement
in 1983 to build a railway between Al Ladhiqiyah and the port
of Tartus.
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—Turkey: An economic commission meeting in June 1983 dis-
cussed possible Soviet help in constructing a nuclear energy
facility and Soviet trucks in Turkey under a license agreement.
A gas pipeline from Yeletz, south of Moscow, across Romania
and Bulgaria, and into Turkey, built at Soviet expense, was
discussed.
—Vietnam: Soviet economic aid to Vietnam was about $9 50
million in 1982. East bloc countries contributed another $500
million. There are currently some 10,000 Soviet diplomats,
military advisors, and technical experts in the country,
including 500 to 600 in Vung Tau looking for petroleum. The
Bach Ho structure is also being explored. Vietnam's first
offshore oil well was to be drilled by Azeris from Baku. The
Australian Age (13 Jun 1983) reported that Moscow has sent
about $5 billion in economic aid, and 3,750 technical advisors
to Vietnam, Kampuchea, and Laos in the last seven years. Since
1979, it has supplied over $2 billion in military assistance,
and 2,500 military advisors. The Black (Da) River was dammed
in January 1983 to build a 1,920-MW hydropower station. The
Far Eastern Economic Review (17 Nov 1983)
, p. 47, notes that
Moscow has trained 60,000 Vietnamese technicians and workers
and nearly 400,000 students from Vietnam have been educated
in the USSR during the past 30 years. This is probably a
typographical error for 40,000 students.
TYPICAL SOVIET MILITARY AID TO THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES
--Argentina: The Argentines used Soviet-made Strela (SAM-7)
antiaircraft weapons during the Falklands War in 1982. The
weapon was not particularly effective. MIG sales to Argen-
tina were discussed in 1983.
--Cuba: Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba totaled about 63,000
tons in 1981, the highest amount since 1962. Deliveries
reached 68,000 tons, worth $1 billion, in 1982. The number
of military advisors rose 20 percent to 2,500. Cuba obtained
140 SAM-3 Goa missiles in December, 1982. They have a maximum
range of 25 miles, and an envelope to 49,000 feet. Two to
three MIG's were also sent late in the year.
--Ethiopia: The USSR requested at least some payment for
the $2 billion loan to buy arms when Mengistu Haile-Mariam
visited the Soviet Union in 1982. Mengistu reportedly told
Moscow his country could pay nothing.
—Grenada: U.S. troops discovered a secret treaty dated
9 February 1981 between the USSR and Grenada during the
October invasion of the island. The treaty was to provide
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without charge some $37 million in military equipment to
Grenada, $25 million from the USSR, and $12 million from
North Korea. Deliveries from the USSR during 1981-83 were
to involve 4,000 submachine guns, 2,500 rifles, 7,000 mines,
15,000 grenades, and 60 armored personnel carriers. The
North Korean treaty dated 14 April 1983 would provide 1,000
automatic rifles with 360,000 rounds of ammunition, 50 light
machine guns, 30 heavy machine guns with 60,000 rounds of
ammunition, 50 ricket-propelled grenade launchers with 500
rounds, 200 hand grenades, two coast guard boats, 6,000 uni-
forms and other equipment. The materiel from the USSR is
listed in the New York Times (7 Nov 1983), p. 10. On 4
November 1983, 126 occupants of the Soviet Embassy on Grenada
left the island, including- 49 Soviets, 53 Cubans, and 15
North Koreans.
—
-India: India is buying Soviet arm.s under a two-billion
ruble loan repayable in 20 years at 2.5 percent interest. The
Indians will manufacture the new MIG-27 in the near future.
The MIG-27 costs approximately $8 million, compared to the
Mirage-2000, which India will also purchase for $30-65 million
each. Moscow has offered New Delhi its MIG-31, which is still
under development. New Delhi has agreed to buy the AN-3 2
medium tactical transport plane. Machinery to assemble the
MIG-27 's was installed at the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltc
.
factory at Nasik. About 200 will be assembled in India, the
first beginning in April, 1984. Indian newspapers reported
in July 1983 that the Soviets had delivered T-72 tanks with
a laser rangefinder. The Soviets agreed in January 1983 to
deliver an undisclosed number of BMP ' s with Saggers.
--Iran: The Soviets are rebuilding a naval base at Chah
Bahar, and an airbase at Konarak at the entrance to the
Persian Gulf.
--Iraq: Iraq currently receives less than 66 percent of
its military equipment from the USSR compared to 95 percent
in 1972. France has become a major supplier. Two Soviet
ships off-loaded arms for Iraq at the Kuwaiti port of Shuiba
on 20 and 27 May 1983. The weapons included artillery shells,
bombs, and missiles. The Christian Science Monitor (28 Mar
1983), p. 6, reported that at least one Iraqi brigade had
been equipped with T-76 tanks. This might have been a mis-
print for T-72's, or a prototype of the T-80.
--Libya: Italian jets intercepted two TU-22's being ferried
from the USSR to Libya as they approached Italian airspace on
20 September 1983. Khadafy signed his first major arms deal
with the Soviets in 1974 for $2.3 billion. Other agreements
were concluded in 1977, 1978, and 1980. The value of the
1980 deal may have been $8 billion. The U.S. Department of
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state estimates the total value of Soviet and East European
arms agreements with Libya at $28 billion, with another being
negotiated for several billion.
—Nicaragua: Thirty-six military bases are under construc-
tion or recently have been completed. The USSR has sent 50
tanks, and East Germany has delivered 1,000 trucks. Nicaragua
has received 100 antiaircraft guns, three brigades of Soviet
artillery, and Soviet assault helicopters and transport air-
craft. In August 1983, the Aleksandr Ulianov brough military
equipment, including at least two helicopters, to Nicaragua.
The Soviet increased the number of their advisors in Nicaragua
from 70 to 100. About 70 Nicaraguan pilots were trained in
Bulgaria in December 19 82, and 30 stopped in Cuba on the way
home to continue training. Five Nicaraguan pilots were study-
ing in the USSR, where they were learning to fly the MIG-21
fighter. The Soviets delivered several AN-16 transport and
MI-8 helicopters to Nicaragua in 1983. They have also provided
16 naval patrol boats. In the past two years, Nicaragua has
obtained 60 tanks, several dozen APC ' s and armored reconnais-
sance vehicles, over 1,000 East German trucks, 122mm and 155mm
field artillery, BM-21 rocket launchers, and 100 anti-aircraft
guns .
—South Yemen: By 19 84 the South Yemeni Army will have
increased 40 percent to 50,000 troops. T-62's and early model
T-72's will replace older models, and may rise from 450 to
about 700. The Air Force has a dozen MIG-23's and some MI-24
helicopters. About 1,500 Yemenis are being trained in the
USSR and East Europe. The Army's 10 infantry brigades will
get some APC ' s and self-propelled heavy guns. Foreign Report
,
#1788 (25 Aug 1983)
, p. 4.
--Syria: The Soviets introduced SA-5 SAM ' s into Syria in
January 1983. Their range is about 155 miles. They had not
been sent outside the USSR prior to this deployment. There
are some 1,200 SA-5's in the Soviet Union. The 75 SA-5's
cost an estimated $2 billion. Syrian President Hafez Assad
said in October 1983 that Moscow and Baghdad were discussing
the possibility of direct Soviet military assistance in
event of an Israeli attack. The Soviet Union has provided
a computerized control system for air defense that extends
into Lebanon. It is linked by satellite to Moscow, The
number of Soviet advisors in Syria has increased from 7,000
to 10,000. The SS-21 was introduced into Syria during 1983.
Its range is about 120 km. There are currently six to nine
of these missiles. The Syrians are increasing the number of
SCUD-B missile launchers from 36 to 54. The USSR has provided
about 160 fighter aircraft, including MIG-23's, for the 96
jets lost over the Bekaa Valley in 1982. Approximately 800
T-72 tanks have been added to Syrian forces. About 200 armored
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